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ABSTRACT 
As presidential candidates rhetorically articulate their beliefs during presidential debates, they 
reveal a lot about their underlying ideological beliefs. These beliefs were examined through the 
lens of an established methodology called the Operational Code, which uses a program to 
decipher a candidate’s beliefs through what they say in debate transcripts. In this study, the belief 
trends of the Operational Codes of all presidential candidates from 1976-2012 were examined 
through a rhetorical lens, and it was found that rhetoric was indeed the driving force for the 
apparent changes in Operational Code beliefs. These changes were examined on a greater level 
of detail through four case studies, which illustrated the changes in Operational Code beliefs and 
rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, the incumbent presidential candidates, the 2004 election, and lastly, 
with the independent presidential candidates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Every four years, the American electorate is given the challenging task of electing a 
president. In the American political climate, this time of the year means much more than a just a 
change between leadership. According to James Barber (1977), the Presidency is “much more 
than an institution” (4). The attitude held towards the presidency is much different from that of 
Congress, because “the president is a symbolic leader, the one figure who draws together 
people’s hopes and fears for the political future” (Barber, 1977, 4). Belief systems and ideologies 
are the driving force in presidential elections. Therefore, when Americans step up to the ballot 
box to vote for President, they are not just voting for the candidate, but the set of beliefs that he 
carries with him.  
To do that, voters must envision how a variety of presidential candidates and their beliefs 
would guide their decisions as President of the United States, if elected. From a psychological 
standpoint, every time a candidate speaks or makes an appearance, he is being judged by voters 
in areas of “character, leadership, and judgment” (Renshon, 1998, 377). On the campaign trail, 
candidates speak about their beliefs non-stop, their words rhetorically crafted in one way or 
another to appeal to American voters. With every word that the candidates say, they are exposing 
their belief systems to the public. Their words are a representation of their beliefs, and their 
beliefs are a testament to the articulations of their ideals.   
 To study this relationship between rhetoric and belief systems in American presidential 
elections, we must first find a way to analyze the belief systems of presidential candidates. The 
link between leaders’ behaviors and their personality traits is not only subject to scrutiny by 
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voters, but also by political scientists and psychoanalysts. Alexander George (1969) argues that 
while analysts are interested in simplifying and structuring the complex world of political actors, 
this type of study is essential for the political actor himself as well, as “he too must somehow 
comprehend complex situations in order to decide how to best deal with them” (200).  
 A candidate’s beliefs highly contribute to his character and personality, and vice versa 
(Barber, 1977).  According to Barber (1977), a president's personality 1) shapes his behavior in 
"nontrivial matters" (6), 2) is one that is patterned and consistent and 3) is shaped not only by 
internal factors, but external environmental factors dominant at the time of his leadership. While 
Barber’s findings are definitive, his methods severely lack standardization, as Barber believes 
that the best way to predict presidential character is to “see how they [a president’s motives and 
beliefs] were put together in the first place” (Barber, 1977, 6). This involves an examination of a 
president’s childhood, their leadership experiences, self-esteem, motives, etc. In addition, Barber 
(1977) himself admits that “character provides the main thrust and broad direction—but it does 
not determine, in any fixed sense, world view and style” (11). In a country where rhetoric itself 
transforms the face of our political climate, a highly qualitative and controversial method like 
Barber’s would prove results too ambiguous as a measure of candidates’ belief systems.   
A well-established methodology called the Operational Code easily fills this gap. 
According to Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003), the Operational Code is more reliable than 
Barber’s methods because the Code works off of “motivational biases rather than simply the 
products of lessons learned from changing experiences in the political universe” (221). In 
addition, the Operational Code serves as a “useful ‘bridge’ or ‘link’ to psychodynamic 
interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems and their role in behavior under 
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different conditions” (George, 1969, 195). This methodology quantitatively analyzes speech 
transcripts in order to examine a leader’s belief system.  
In summary, the Operational Code represents an actor’s beliefs at the psychoanalytic 
level—why they believe what they say, the rationality and motivation for what they do. This 
research method has had significant findings in researching international leaders and their 
impacts of foreign policy (Walker, 2000). Surprisingly, however, this interest has not widely 
transferred over to the study of presidential candidates as a group. When these methodologies are 
used for assessing presidents or presidential candidates, they only focus on presidential rhetoric 
that spans from the time the leaders first entered and left office, or concentrate on the analysis of 
one particular candidate during his presidential campaign (Renshon, 1998; Schafer & Crichlow, 
2000; Walker & Falkowski, 1984; Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998, 2003). Lastly, the 
Operational Code has never been used to examine the relationship between the articulations of a 
leader’s beliefs in relation to the rhetorical situation of the changing political climate. 
The purpose of this study was to use an established methodology to answer a new 
question: What do the beliefs of presidential candidates reveal about the rhetoric of our ever-
changing political climate?  
Why Presidential Candidates? 
As mentioned earlier, the Operational Code is not typically used to study presidential 
candidates, per say, but the method surely has the potential to reveal a great deal of new 
information about presidential candidates and their in-group comparisons. The Operational Code 
reveals a presidential candidate’s belief system, which gives a deeper, even a more sub-
conscious, view of his beliefs than what is exposed by his party’s ideology. If a presidential 
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candidate exhibits these beliefs through his speech during presidential debates, this can be used 
by the American electorate as a predictor to how they will act and behave in the White House.  
Additionally, presidential candidates are an ideal group of what Margaret Hermann 
(2003) would call a “norming group” (17). First of all, the leaders in this group are competing 
against each other for the same job, the President of the United States. Secondly, each of them 
have a considerable amount of experience that qualifies them to run for this position, which 
means that they have all had a significant amount of time to develop their beliefs. By comparing 
their Operational Codes, we will be able to determine what beliefs these candidates planned to 
bring with them to the White House.  
Why Presidential Debates? 
Even though there are many different kinds of texts that one could use to study 
presidential candidates, presidential debates are actually ideal because of their natural format and 
dynamics. Televised presidential debates are a medium through which candidates can express 
themselves in an environment that is fair game—in other words, it’s ultimately the candidates 
who are competing on the debate floor, not their fundraisers, their field organizers, or their 
volunteers. Additionally, the debates themselves provide the candidates a uniform speaking 
format where all major candidates get the chance to speak in the same forms, such as opening 
and closing statements, rebuttals, etc. In addition, a study by Schafer and White (2007) 
confirmed that content analysis of transcripts work best in situations where “the individual is 
speaking spontaneously under moderate stress levels” (42).  
The unsettling dynamics of a debate keep the format a lively one. It’s no secret that 
candidates are vigorously prepared for their debates weeks ahead of time. By the time they 
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candidates reach the debate floor, they have already practiced ways to answer every question and 
give every answer. Even with all of that preparation, however, each candidate still has the 
looming potential to have a disastrous night. It seems, that no matter how prepared a presidential 
candidate is, anything and everything can happen.  
It is for these reasons why presidential debates are the ideal text to study for this type of 
content analysis. Based off of Hermann’s guidelines, presidential debates contain a perfect 
mixture of planned and spontaneous speech (1998). According to Hermann, planned speeches or 
public statements pre-written by a leader and his speech writers “reflect what the leader wants, 
and is pledging, to be,” (as cited in Hermann, 1998, 5). More “off-the-cuff” speech, on the other 
hand, is more spontaneous, as “leaders must respond quickly without props or aid” (Hermann, 
2003, 179). This type of speech can give insight as to what the leader is really like in his private 
life and behind closed doors (Hermann, 2003). Hermann (2003) also emphasizes the importance 
of analyzing full, complete texts, as we are interested in the behavior of the leader, not the slant 
that a reporter might try to create when editing the tapes of an interview. The natural format of 
presidential debates gives us a perfect combination of planned speech and spontaneous speech, in 
its full text. 
The Operational Code – The History  
Over a period of about sixty years, the Operational Code has been transformed as a 
methodology. Since Leites (1953) published his work on the Operational Code of the Politburo 
in 1953, there have been numerous improvements to the methodology of using the Operational 
Code. Unlike Barber’s (1977) idea to study a political leader’s childhood in order to determine 
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their character, the Operational Code has been heavily institutionalized; developing theory, 
typologies, and methods for execution over time.  
Nathan Leites (1953) first used the operational code in “A Study of Bolshevism,” 
published in 1953, in which he analyzed “the precepts of maxims of political tactics and strategy 
that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics” (George, 1969, 193), or 
“Bolshevik character” (George, 1969, 201). At the time of its publication, Leites’ work was 
considered to be more sophisticated in method, in fact, “some thought it introduced a new genre 
of elite study that might fill some of the needs for a behavioral approach to studies of political 
leadership” (George, 1969, 192). Leites’(1953) intention in studying the Bolsheviks by means of 
the Operational Code was to “discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for 
effective political conduct” in an attempt to “draw explicit and systematic formulations” from a 
mass of Bolshevik literature, and to “set them down in a meaningful frame of reference.”  
Some years after the publication of Leites’ work, it was re-examined by Alexander 
George (1969), who claimed that what Leites claimed as “maxims of political strategy” were 
actually the political beliefs of actors (Walker, 1990, 404). George (1969) believed that Leites’ 
term “operational code” was a bit misleading, as the term implied that an Operational Code was 
an automatic recipe that faithfully used in decision making. However, he interpreted Leites’ 
Operational Code as more of “a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and 
central questions of politics” as they relate to problem-solving in politics (George, 1969, 196). 
By definition, George (1969) claimed that “a leader’s operational code should be identified 
simply as a political belief system in which some elements (philosophical beliefs) guide the 
leader’s diagnosis of the context for action and others (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the most 
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effective strategy and tactics in achieving goals.” In his work, George (1969) took Leites’ work 
and re-examined it though his own perspective, making the Operational Code more replicable 
and theory-based. George essentially re-organized the ideas produced in Leites’ work into two 
types of beliefs that he believed were present in the Operational Code, philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs.  
Inspired by George, Ole Holsti (1970), in his attempt to further refine the methodology 
for the Operational Code, created a typology of the six different types of belief systems political 
actors could have. He created these typologies by determining how political actors might answer 
George’s first philosophical questions, “What is the fundamental nature of the political 
universe?” and “What are the fundamental sources of conflict?” (Holsti, 1970, 123).  Based on 
the answers to George’s questions, political actors would fall into Types A, B, C, or Type DEF 
of Holsti’s typology. This typology gave political scientists and political psychologists a 
guideline on how to identify the beliefs of a political actor according to the Operational Code, 
making the method even more quantifiable in nature and practice. In later years, after the 
production of multiple case studies that used the Operational Code, Holsti (1977) re-examined 
these case studies to check the validity of his original typology.  
In 1984, while studying the Operational Codes of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
State, Walker and Falkowski (1984) further refined Holsti’s typology by creating specific “belief 
statements” (411) that more specifically defined the political beliefs and motivations that were 
apparent in each type of belief system present in the typology. This revised typology led Walker 
and Falkowski (1984, 1990) to claim that the “aggregate pattern of crisis bargaining tactics by 
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the governments of these decision-makers” tended to correspond to these congruent patterns of 
motivations and beliefs. 
 Walker, Schafer and Young (1998) further improved the methodology of the Operational 
Code in 1998 while studying the Operational Code of President Jimmy Carter. They decided to 
study the Operational Code through means of the Verbs In Context System (known as VICS) 
(Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998). The VICS method codes certain attributes according to the 
“utterances” said in rhetorical speech, based on George’s (1969) philosophical and instrumental 
beliefs (Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998, 182).  
As explained above, the Operational Code has transformed as a result of the work of 
different studies that sought to add on to the current methodology at the time. The mechanics for 
the Operational Code methodology are explained below. 
The Operational Code – The Method 
The Operational Code contains two types of content, philosophical content and 
instrumental content. The following questions define the Philosophical Content of an Operational 
Code (George, 1969):  
• What is the “essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of 
harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? 
(George, 1969, 201) 
• What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values 
and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in 
what respects the one and/or the other? (George, 1969, 203) 
• Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? (George, 1969, 203) 
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• How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is 
one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction? (George, 1969, 
204) 
• What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development? (George, 
1969, 204) 
The Instrumental Beliefs of an Operational Code are defined in the following questions (George, 
1969): 
• What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? (George, 
1969, 205) 
• How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? (George, 1969, 211) 
• How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? (George, 1969, 
212) 
• What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest? (George, 1969, 215) 
• What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest? (George, 
1969, 216) 
From here, as political actors are examined, their behaviors place them in one of Holsti’s (1970) 
typologies, Types, A, B, C, and DEF. Types A, B, and C, are considered to be “optimistic,” 
attributing to the claim that those actors who fall in these typologies belief that world conflict is 
temporary. Types DEF, on the other hand, are grouped together and considered to be 
“pessimistic” in belief, due to the fact that actors who fall in this typology are claimed to believe 
that world conflict is ongoing and permanent. These typologies are illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1 
As mentioned before, Walker and Falkowski (1984) re-organized Holsti’s original typologies 
into more specific belief statements, in order to better define what types of political leaders fall 
into these typologies present in Figure 2. 
 
 
Type A 
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A 
“conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. 
Opponents are often influenced by non-rational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to 
conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and willingness to 
shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. 
Instrumental: Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interest. Pursue broadly 
international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and 
acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for 
negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.  
Type B 
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are 
the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding 
realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical 
development is possible. Instrumental: One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a 
comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource 
may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited 
risk.  
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Type C 
Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent 
harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of 
causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. 
One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and 
control over historical development is low under anarchy. Instrumental: Establish optimal goals 
vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting 
means rather than ends. Act quickly when reconciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory 
actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.  
Type DEF 
Philosophical: Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) or international 
anarchy (F). Powerful disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary and responses to 
conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run 
depends on the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control 
over historical development. Instrumental: Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use 
military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.  
Walker and Falkowski’s revised Holsti typologies (as cited by Walker, 1990, 411) 
 
Figure 2 
The Operational Code currently functions by means of the Verbs in Context System (or VICS), 
which, as defined by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998, 1999), is “a set of techniques for 
retrieving belief patterns from a leader’s public statements and drawing inferences about public 
behavior that are compatible with these beliefs.” The VICS system records “utterances,” defined 
as “each verb in the statement and the corresponding parts of speech associated with the verb—
the subject and object (if it is transitive verb), or the subject and predicate nominative or 
adjective (if it is an intransitive verb)” (Walker, Schafer & Young 2003, 224). From there, the 
VICS method attributes six attributes to the data produced from the utterances; “subject, verb 
category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context” (Walker, Schafer & 
Young 2003, 224). 
Over time, the Operational Code has been vastly transformed over and over again in 
order to study the Operational Codes of leaders from around the world. Through these 
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transformations, there have been developments in the theory and the lenses for analysis in this 
methodology, resulting in the current methods that are used today. Through a new lens, I was 
able to analyze how beliefs and the rhetorical articulation of those beliefs in presidential debates 
have dominated the American political climate. 
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METHODOLOGY  
  In order to conduct a context analysis of the speech in presidential debates in order to 
study candidates’ operational codes, I prepared my texts for analysis, processed the texts using a 
program called Profiler Plus 5.8.4., and analyzed the results from the program. From there, I 
cross-examined the different results from the belief values, and analyzed how political beliefs 
determined the rhetoric surrounding those beliefs.  
 First and foremost, I collected transcripts of presidential debates ranging from 1976-2012 
election cycles. Based on the historical background on American presidential debates, it is clear 
that presidential debates did not become truly “regular” until 1976 (Schroeder, 2000). So, by 
analyzing the fifty-five presidential debates that took place during that particular time period, I 
was using a text sample that is rhetorically expected in regards to its regularly scheduled 
appearances. These presidential debate transcripts were obtained at no cost from the website of 
the Commission on Presidential Debates.  
 From there, I prepared my texts for analyzing using Profiler Plus 5.8.4. This program is 
specifically designed to analyze Schafer’s methodology for the Operational Code using the 
Verbs in Context System. Unlike other programs where a user would have to manually input 
their own codes or key words, Profile Plus 5.8.4. has “pre-sets” of  the codes that Schafer used to 
study the Operational Code. To prepare each presidential debate transcript for processing, I had 
to separate the difference lines of text spoken by each presidential candidate in order to make 
sure that I would be analyzing the candidate’s own words, not those of his opponent’s or the 
moderator’s.  
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 Once this was done, I processed the prepared debate transcripts through Profiler Plus, and 
the program gave me a mass data set, outlining the different scores for each candidate for the 
various beliefs and values of the Operational Code. This data sheet is available in Appendix I.  
 The values I chose to research were P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2.  
• P1 – Nature of the political universe.  
• P2 – Prospects for realization of political values.  
• P4 – Belief in historical control  
• I1 – Approach to goals (direction of strategy)  
• I2 – Pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)  
 From here, I ran the results using a means comparison analysis for these different values 
in IBM SPSS in respect to my research questions. I first ran a means comparison analysis that 
compared election years with belief scores of each party. I ran a second means comparison 
analysis that compared the belief scores for each individual debate.  
 In order to better understand the rhetorical situations and historical data associated with 
each debate, I referenced different sources of historical data and rhetorical theory. Materials on 
rhetorical theory were obtained through The Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient 
Greece and various scholarly articles. Historical data (i.e. domestic and international events that 
surrounded each presidential debate) were obtained through election information as available in 
the Change and Continuity in Elections series. So-called “winners” and “losers” of debates were 
determined through historical data as described by the Change in Continuity in Elections Series 
(Abramson, Aldrich, & Rhode), as well as through Gallup Polls and reactions from the 
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FiveThirtyEight Blog written by Nate Silver. These sources all cited the historical winners and 
losers of presidential debates. 
  By using the established methodology of the Operational Code while also putting my 
own twist on analyzing its results, I was able to create a General Results Overview (available in 
the next chapter), in which I was able to see the results from a full-scale vantage point. However, 
in order to better create a more comprehensive analysis that would be able to characterize the 
trends emerging from different election cycles, I decided to divide up the most significant trends 
from my analysis into four different case studies, available in the chapters that follow.  
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OVERVIEW OF RESULTS  
In considering how beliefs have dominated election cycles through the history of 
presidential elections, I had originally chosen to answer the following research questions below. 
For a clearer view of the results, please refer to Appendices D-I. 
What Beliefs Are Apparent And Consistent Over Time?   
Walker (2000) suggests that tracking certain characteristics over time create predictions 
about what future actions a leader might take, as well as any possible shifts in behavior that 
might occur.  
In examining the evolution of beliefs from 1976-2012, it was found that belief values 
rose and fell together for almost every election, with only some anomalies.  
As I examined the profiles of presidential candidates that have debated in two or more 
election cycles, I discovered that candidates’ beliefs change from when they first debate to 
become president to when they are debating to keep themselves in office. Not a single incumbent 
candidate had consistent belief scores when comparing one round of debates to the next.  
Are Certain Beliefs Exclusive To Party Lines?   
The Democratic and Republican parties have dominated the American political system 
for hundreds of years, and so have their candidates. With the exception of John Anderson and 
Ross Perot, candidates have either debated as a Democrat or a Republican.  
In examining whether Democratic and Republican candidates have similar operational 
code scores in-party, it was found that scores are not consistent on the basis of party. In other 
words, scores rose and fell together in terms of party lines.  
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In examining Democrat belief systems against Republican belief systems, it was found 
that they had very similar beliefs from election to election. In this way, it was clear that each 
party molded their beliefs and their candidate to the historical factors of the election.  
Do “Winners” And “Losers” Of Debates Have Similar Beliefs? 
For presidential debates, one of the most pertinent goals of the candidate is winning the 
debate. Whoever wins the debate provides extra momentum for their presidential campaign in 
the short run, and that surge of momentum in the campaign cycle could mean extra percentage 
points in the polls.   
In finding out of there were certain beliefs that all debate and elections winners or losers 
share, it was evident that presidential candidates were all over the map—in other words, there 
was no specific evidence from the Operational Code scores that could necessarily determine a 
winner or loser of a debate, or the election.  
It can be inferred that articulated beliefs are a product of rhetorical statements, in some 
form or another. Therefore, when a candidate speaks about his beliefs, he is presenting his 
thoughts in a rhetorical manner. When the beliefs of a candidate change, the way in which he 
speaks about them are bound to change as well. In other words, beliefs and the words used to 
articulate them act together as a unit. In examining the case studies that follow, the relationship 
between Operational code beliefs and debate rhetoric will be examined on a closer level. I will 
examine the answers to the following questions:  
Over time: What was the rhetorical and historical situation for each election, and 
how do these factors account for the ways that belief scores rise and fall the way 
they do?  
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By Party: How or in what ways were parties and candidates changing their 
beliefs to match the exigency of what the election called for? 
Winners/Losers: Which candidate was able to master the art of debating 
rhetorically, and why did it work (or not work) so well?   
One election cycle at a time, presidential candidates have highly influenced the belief 
systems and the discourse of the American political climate. Candidates shape their discourse 
according to the beliefs that they hold to be true. As their beliefs change, the way in which they 
articulate those beliefs will change as well. The following case studies will use the Operational 
Code to look at belief systems with a new rhetorical perspective. In doing so, the results shed 
light on how and when our political environment began to mirror the current state of politics in 
the United States.     
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RHETORICAL THEORY OVERVIEW 
INTRODUCTION  
Considering that the articulation of beliefs change the rhetoric of the presidential debates, 
there are certain rhetorical factors that affect the way in which beliefs are articulated. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the rhetorical concepts that will be 
used to explain this phenomenon in the case studies that follow, and to also provide a basis for 
the results presented in the General Results Overview.   
The Rhetorical Situation as Defined by Grant-Davie  
Rhetor   
According to rhetorician Keith-Grant Davie (1997), a rhetor is defined as “those people, 
real or imagined, responsible for the discourse and its authorial voice.”  For the intents and 
purpose of this discussion, a rhetor is primarily the presidential candidate themselves, but the 
candidate is not the only rhetor in play during presidential debates.  
Grant-Davie (1997) notes that rhetors “play several roles at once.” Candidates as rhetors 
are no different—they do not speak just as themselves, but as their political parties, their 
speechwriters, or even their major campaign contributors. In addition, when building their own 
ethos, or credibility, the rhetor might play several roles at once, that when pulled together, form 
the composite rhetor of the candidate.  For example, when Barack Obama ran for president in 
2004, he played several roles at once as a rhetor. He was the moderate and the liberal, the young 
but experienced Senator from Illinois, the tenacious but patient leader, the man that grew up 
from nothing and graduated from Harvard, the father of his children, and the aspiring leader of 
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his political party—all of whom he was and would be if elected to be President of the United 
States.    
As rhetors, presidential candidates have to take what they’ve prepared for weeks or 
months and let it unfold into the proper setting of the debates. According to Consigny (1997), 
rhetors use both integrity and receptivity in their speech. Debate-wise, integrity, “a measure of 
consistency they take from situation to situation” can be thought of as the long-rehearsed talking 
points and stump speeches that candidates give during debates, things that still work in the 
debates, but have also worked during other rhetorical situations, such as campaign rallies. 
However, in the ever-changing rhetorical nature of debates, a candidate cannot survive a debate 
on integrity alone. He also must have receptivity, “the ability to adapt to new situations and not 
rigidly play the same role in everyone one” (Grant-Davie, 1997). This concepts highlights the 
spontaneous nature of debates, while illustrating that no matter how much a candidate has 
prepared, he must be prepared to be flexible and change with the rhetorical situation as it ebbs 
and flows during the debate.  
Audience  
Grant-Davie defines audience as “those people, real or imagined, with whom the rhetors 
negotiate through discourse to achieve the rhetorical objectives” (1997).  In terms for audiences 
for presidential debates, the rhetors address several audiences: the American electorate and its 
many constituents of all different races, economic classes, and standing, the candidate’s 
opponent and his campaign, the base and outsiders of his political party, his dissenters, and the 
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independents. There are, of course, an infinite amount of audiences that the candidates must 
face—an enormous task for one person to attempt to master.  
As much as a presidential candidate will try to resonate with his diverse audiences as 
possible, it is something that he might not be able to ever master completely. However, the 
degree to which a candidate can effectively resonate with his audiences will reflect how close (or 
how far away) he is to winning the presidency. If the candidate’s rhetoric does not sit well with 
his audiences, he risks throwing away his chances for the presidency.  
Constraints 
Constraints are defined by Grant-Davie (1997) as “factors in the situation’s context that 
may affect the achievement of the rhetorical objectives.” The candidate as the rhetor must 
maneuver around and through constraints in order to be successful in the debate.  
A candidate’s own integrity and receptivity act as contradictory constraints, as the 
president must work within the constraints of what he has prepared, but must remain calm and 
respond when the debate throws him a fork in the road. In this high-pressure situation, the 
president must maneuver existing constraints to make sure that something he spontaneously says 
does not cost him a vital audience, or worse, the election.  
 The setting of a presidential debate itself has many constraints. For one, the format of the 
debate, whether it be formal or town-hall style, constrains how the moderator controls the debate 
and who asks the questions in the debate. The rules regarding format and timing, tirelessly 
negotiated between both campaigns and the Commission on Presidential Debates, also greatly 
constrains the candidates, as they are limited by limits on timing, rebuttals, closing statements, 
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and the subjects that each debate contains (i.e. domestic or policy issues, or more specifically, 
issues such as taxes or the War in Iraq). In addition to the subjects presented to each debate, the 
questions that are asked regarding each subject provide a constraint to the candidates, as they not 
only dictate the debate itself, but also test the candidates’ ability to use their receptivity to match 
what they’ve practiced to answer the question at hand. To make it harder, historically, debate 
moderators have chosen to keep the debate questions to themselves prior to the start of the 
debate. As once stated by moderator Jim Lehrer during the first presidential debate of 2000, “The 
questions and the subjects were chosen by me alone. I have told no one from the two campaigns, 
or the Commission, or anyone else involved what they are” (CPD, 2000). Finally, the medium of 
the debates, usually broadcast through television and radio, provide constraints for the 
candidates, as they must navigate certain debate tactics pertinent to this medium. Constraints are 
also created by debate speech and rhetoric as the debate plays out. Candidates are often 
constrained by what their opponents level against them, and are forced to respond against their 
opponent’s allegations instead of talking about the issue at hand.  
However, constraints should not just be considered as negative factors that hinder 
candidates during debates. There are also constraints that the rhetor can harness to his advantage 
(Grant-Davie, 1997). For example, the constraint of time could be considered to be a hindrance if 
the allotted time does not allow enough time for the candidate to express his ideals. However, if 
the candidate has already expressed his ideals and has time to spare, he can use this extra time in 
the spotlight to highlight his stance on another issue, a popular move used by presidential 
candidates to clear up “falsehoods” portrayed by their opponent about themselves.   
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Exigence  
Exigence is defined as “the matter and motivation of the discourse” by Grant-Davie 
(1997). Exigence is not just about what the candidate says, but why they are saying it. Exigencies 
of the candidates will include what they are speaking about, why that speech is needed, and what 
that speech is trying to accomplish (Grant-Davie, 1997). 
A rhetor, or in this case, a presidential candidate, must respond to the exigence of the 
presidential debate in a way that resonates tightly with his audiences within the given constraints. 
It is imperative that he does this, because if his exigency does not respond to the situation that he 
faces, he risks losing his audience or his own credibility.  
Another aspect about responding to the exigency of a presidential debate is the debate’s 
timing in the election. In many debates, such as in the 1992 debate Bill Clinton, George H. W. 
Bush and Ross Perot, or in the 2008 debates between Barack Obama and John McCain, the 
economy took a sudden downturn during the debate period. Both Clinton and Obama succeeded 
greatly in utilizing the rhetorical concept of kairos, Greek for timing, by capitalizing on the 
situation of the bad economy, and using rhetoric to face this problem head-on and use that 
situation to their advantage.  
Kairos as a Driving Force  
Kairos, in the Greek language, means the timing of rhetoric. However, kairos means 
much more than just “timing” itself. According to Debra Hawhee (2004), “Kairos marks force. 
Kairos is thus rhetoric’s timing….quality, [and] direction.”  Continuing with the example above, 
it wasn’t just Clinton or Obama’s timing that helped them to successfully capitalize on the bad 
economy, it was the hard-hitting force and relevant quality of their rhetoric that made them 
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successful, as they were able to resonate with their audience and make them realize how 
important it was to elect them as president because of the current economic situation.   
Hawhee (2004) also talks about how kairos is a word used in the ancient culture that 
relates to the art of weaving. She mentions how kairos, in variation, is used to describe “where 
threads attach to the loom; the act of fastening these threads…that which is tightly woven.” In 
regards to rhetoric, this related example of the word kairos helps to describe not just the force of 
kairos, but the fact that a successful usage of kairos requires an intense level of relevancy. In 
other words, “woven,” in a weaver’s case, translates to “relevant to the times” in a rhetor’s case. 
The situation in which the timing of kairos takes place must be relevant to the audience. 
Continuing with the example above, the reason why capitalizing on the bad economy worked so 
well for Clinton and Obama was because the bad economy affected every person in the 
American electorate, and they were looking for a solution to make the situation better. While 
talking about the environment might resonate with only those that care about the environment, 
the economy is a relevant and close-to-home topic for every voter.   
In the scholarship of rhetoric, there are two basic models for kairos, the accommodation 
and creation models of kairos. The accommodation model, spearheaded by rhetorician James 
Kinneavy (2004), dictates that “kairos directs the rhetor to consider to adapt to the tones and 
moods of the situation at hand…the character of the audience to which the speaker must suit his 
language and argument.”  
Baumlin formulates a creation model of kairos, one where the “rhetor-in-charge creates 
his or her own operates…who operates mainly with the awareness of kairos responds 
simultaneously to the fleeting situation at hand…both a hunter and maker of unique 
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opportunities…ready to address improvisationally and confer meaning on new and emerging 
situations” (Hawhee, 2004). Baumlin’s creation model of kairos relates heavily to Cosigny’s 
concept receptivity, both capturing the importance of the rhetor’s ability to speak toward new 
situations. The creation model of kairos and receptivity can help describe the way in which all 
debates differ from one another, as well as the fact that no matter how much a candidate prepares 
for a debate, he cannot predict the outcome or his performance during the debate until that 
moment arrives.  
Conclusion  
Using the constituents of the rhetorical situation—rhetor, audience, constraints, and 
exigence—will give a different perspective when interpreting Operational Code belief changes. 
Kairos is the driving force for most of the results presented in the results overview. Based on the 
findings presented in the results overview, it seems that candidates and parties tailor their 
rhetoric based on kairos—in other words, their beliefs (and the rhetoric articulating those belief) 
change with the exigence and kairos of every election in order to appeal with the audience, the 
American electorate.  
This explains why mean scores by party are not consistent from election to election, yet 
rise and fall together with every election, and why winners and losers were not consistent from 
debate to debate. Rhetorically and methodologically, the beliefs of candidates and parties are 
only are articulated based on what they think the American people will vote for.  
With every election, there are different beliefs of the audience that the candidates must 
appeal to, and ideally, the candidate who was able to match his beliefs with the beliefs of the 
American electorate won the election.  
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It is important to remember the relationships between rhetoric, audience, constraints, 
exigence and kairos, as they will illustrate why beliefs changed in the way that they did, and to 
what extent throughout the years. As candidates are analyzed in the upcoming case studies, they 
will be evaluated on whether they were able to connect with their audience in a way that wins 
them the presidency. This also includes how well each candidate effectively capitalized on their 
exigency through the use of kairos, using the timing of their campaign and the debates to their 
advantage.  
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CASE STUDY: RONALD REAGAN, 1980-1984 
INTRODUCTION  
Out of any other candidate studied in this thesis, Ronald Reagan is the one that was able 
to nearly unite the entire nation with his rhetoric, with victories in 45 states in 1980, and victories 
49 out of 50 states during his re-election in 1984. His role as “The Great Communicator” in the 
face of this overwhelming victory is quite significant in terms of the Operational Code. 
Interestingly enough, Reagan was a leader who won the presidency and his re-election by 
landslides during a time period in which the lowest Operational Code mean scores were 
exhibited, by both him and his Democratic opponents Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale. While 
Carter’s scores are completely different from Reagan’s it seems that Mondale’s scores were 
somewhat closer to Reagan’s, possibly signifying that Mondale attempted to be closer 
rhetorically to Reagan.  
This chapter will focus on Ronald Regan in terms of his Operational Code scores as 
shaped in presidential debates between 1980-1984. This chapter will also focus on Mondale’s 
attempts to imitate Reagan’s Operational Code scores, as well as significance of this finding.  
Reagan’s Role As A Rhetor In The 1980-1984 Elections  
The Election of 1980  
As the opposition against the Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter who had an ill-fated 
presidency, Ronald Reagan gained ethos, or credibility, as a rhetor by opposing Carter on many 
issues, but more importantly, being the kairotic answer to many of America’s problems.  
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For example, one of the problems with President Carter’s stance on inflation was that, 
according to Abramson et al. (1982), he placed it “at the top of his economic priorities” at a time 
when inflation was at record highs. Therefore, as Abramson et al. (1982) put it, “Carter, as 
president, was held responsible by many for high inflation and interest rates…” Reagan, coming 
in with his plans of supply-side economics, was, in a sense, the kairotic anecdote that would cure 
Carter’s Democratic fiscal policies that had led to high inflation and interest rates.  
In regards to the two party platforms at their respective conventions, it seems that Reagan 
and the Republicans were out to change foreign policy direction from that of the Democrats as 
well. Since it was perceived that President Carter terribly handled the Iran Hostage Crisis, 
Reagan’s foreign policies again swept in as relief for Carter’s perceived ineffectiveness.  
Carter supposedly “got mean” during the election, but what else was he supposed to do 
when his own popularity was dropping due to the fact that his opponent was the supposed 
kairotic anecdote to all that he had done wrong during his presidency?  
The results of the 1980 election made it pretty clear that Reagan had entranced America 
as a rhetor with his rhetoric and beliefs. Reagan won 50.8% of the popular vote and forty-four of 
the states, while Carter had won only 41.0% of the vote and only six states plus D.C., while 
Anderson won 6.6% of the popular vote and zero states. These results showed America’s need to 
get rid of Carter and replace him with someone like Reagan, a person who they felt had what it 
took to lead them through the 1980’s with confidence and vigor that had been absent from the 
presidency for so long.  
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The Election of 1984  
As a president who had to defend his own record, Reagan’s role as a rhetor had changed 
quite a bit from the 1980 election. No longer was he the one that was rallying against an 
opponent, but he was trying to garner his same supporters with a presidential record.  
During his first term as president, Reagan’s implementation of supply-side economics 
resulted in a brief recession in 1982, however, the economy miraculously recovered between 
1983-1984. Unemployment had also actually gone down during Reagan’s term to 8.2% in 1983. 
In addition, the inflation rate at the time of Reagan’s re-election was below 5%, which was 
significantly less compared to the rate of inflation of when Carter had run for re-election, which 
was 13.5% at the time. Lastly, Reagan’s approval rating at the time that he left office stood at a 
whopping 61% (Abramson et al., 1986). It seems like what Reagan had promised he had mostly 
delivered, which was good, because the American people were desperate for results when they 
had elected him back in 1980, and were satisfied enough to elect him again in 1984.   
For the election of 1984, the Democratic Party that was automatically “on the defensive” 
throughout the election, trying to justify “why a Democrat should be elected instead of Reagan” 
(Abramson et al., 1982). Considering that Reagan’s ethos as a rhetor, his relevant exigence 
during the election, and his strong kairotic ties with the issues that he articulated during his 
campaign, this was a poor choice of rhetoric exigence for the Democrats, as if they were willing 
putting themselves in front of a speeding train.  
Reagan’s scores for value P1 decrease to the lowest P1 score out of all other presidents. 
In 1980, he held a P1 score of .2250, which dropped to .0650 in 1984. This means that Reagan 
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believed that the nature of the political universe was hostile more so than any other presidential 
candidate.   
Reagan’s P2 scores follow this same pattern. Reagan’s P2 score in 1980 was .0500, 
which dropped to -.0200 in 1984, against, making his score the lowest score out of all of the 
other presidential candidates. This demonstrates that Reagan was the most pessimistic out of the 
other presidents regarding the realization of his political values.  
Reagan’s score for P4 actually increases between 1980-1984, changing from .2650 to 
.3300. Reagan’s I1 score decreased during this time period, while his I2 score decreased. His I1 
score decreased from .3700 in 1980 to .3350 in 1984, while his I2 score increased from .1050 in 
1980 to .1250 in 1984. This means that from the time period between running for office and his 
re-election, Reagan believed in more conflict-oriented tactics but more cooperative strategies.  
Since Reagan’s belief had a significant standing in regards to the amount of votes he 
received in the 1980 election, this sent out a clear message to his Democratic opponents. 
Mondale, attempting to capture the kairos that Reagan had during the 1980 elections, had 
articulated his beliefs in a similar manner—not in a manner that strayed against the views of the 
Democratic Party, but in a way which communicated that, on a very fundamental and basic 
world, was looking at the same world and election period as Reagan. 
How Reagan’s Opponents Measure Up; Mondale’s Mistake  
When comparing Reagan to his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale, it seems as if the 
Democrats were attempting to match their rhetoric to the tone of the 1984 campaign, bending 
their rhetoric to act more like Reagan’s resulting in low scores across most of the values.  
Mondale’s scores sometimes come close to Reagan’s, but considering that Reagan 
31  
overwhelmingly won both the popular and electoral votes, it’s clear that his ideas still separated 
him from Reagan, even though his belief scores were in the vicinity of Reagan’s.  
Carter and Mondale react quite differently to Reagan in regards to their mean scores for 
the value P1. Carter’s P1 score of .5000 dropped to Mondale’s score of .1400 in 1984. Reagan’s 
P1 score plunged as well, as he scored .2250 in 1980, and .0650 in 1984. It seems that kairos and 
historical factors seem responsible for the fact that both parties plunged in scores from 1980-
1984, but there’s more to the story. In 1980, Carter was very high up in comparison to Reagan on 
this value, and essentially made no effort to be like Reagan on this score. Noting Carter’s losses, 
Mondale tried to make his rhetoric a little more like Reagan’s in order to win the election. This 
attempt, however, was unsuccessful, because he had rhetorically articulated that he believed that 
the nature of the political universe was more hostile than Reagan had articulated it to be. It seems 
like Mondale’s rhetoric on this value changed because of kairos, but also because he wanted to 
get on a level that was close to Reagan’s beliefs, even though their campaign ideas were 
completely different.  
 The Democrats had a similar reaction in mean scores with value P2, as Mondale’s scores 
dropped to be in the same ballpark as Reagan’s scores. The Democrats’ scores for P2 dropped 
dramatically from 1980-1984, while Reagan’s changes between scores during this time period 
are not that significant. Carter’s mean score for P2 in 1980 was .3600, while Mondale’s score in 
1984 was .0350. Reagan’s score in 1980 was .0500, and in 1980, it had dropped to -.0200. This 
essentially means that the Democrats believed that Carter’s mean score had been too high for this 
value in 1980, considering his loss. So, with Mondale, they sought to match his beliefs/rhetoric 
more towards Reagan. They did this to a significant degree with a mean score difference of 
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.3250, but they did not go far enough, as Mondale’s score still sits above Reagan’s mean score 
for this value in 1984.   
Going along with their instincts to articulate the situation of the 1984 election, their 
scores for I1 and I2 show that tried to hard in this regard. The Democrats’ score for I1 fell 
significantly between 1980-1984, but Reagan’s scores barely decreased during that time. Both 
Carter’s and Reagan’s I1 score was .3700 in 1980, but in 1984, Mondale’s score dropped down 
the Democrats down to .1650, while Reagan’s had barely decreased at .3350. Similar findings 
were discovered with value I2, where the score decreased for the Democrats from .1200 to .0350, 
but increased for Reagan, from .1050 to .1250. In both of these cases, Mondale, possibly trying 
to rhetorically match Reagan, went too far with his efforts in this regard, rhetorically articulating 
that he believed in more conflicted-oriented strategies than Reagan did, which did not resonate 
well with the American people.   
With the P4 value, the Democrats followed the same trend as Reagan, but still were not 
close enough to make an impact. The scores for P4 actually increased during this period. In 
1980, Carter’s mean score for P4 showed that he had the lowest belief in his ability to control 
historical development out of every election cycle, .1700, in 1984, Mondale’s score was .2580. 
Reagan’s score rose as well, although with a much smaller influx than the Democrats’, from 
.2650 in 1980 to .3300 in 1984. Mondale, again, tried to match his rhetoric in regards to Reagan, 
but still came up short with a lower score than Reagan had in 1984.  
When comparing Reagan’s mean scores to those of the Democrats, it is clear that the 
Democrats realized that they needed to change their outlook when they reflected upon Jimmy 
Carter’s performance in the 1980 election. Walter Mondale’s Operational Code scores in the 
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1984 election came relatively close to Reagan’s at times, but he still lost the election in an ass-
kicking defeat against Reagan.  
Conclusion  
Reagan’s rhetoric was a strong force attributing to his landslide victories in the 1980 and 
1984 elections. In his first election, Reagan gained ethos as a rhetor by acting as the kairotic 
answer to America’s problems. He won 50.8% of the popular vote and 44 states in his first 
election, and an overwhelming victory for his kairotic rhetoric. In his second election, Reagan’s 
exigence changed as a result of his incumbency, but his kairotic connection with the American 
people was still strong.  
 In the 1984 election, Reagan exhibited some of the lowest Operational Code scores out of 
all of the presidential candidates that were studied. Out of the candidates that were studied, 
Reagan believed that the nature of the political universe was the most hostile, and he was the 
most pessimistic about the realization of his political values. In regards to his other Operational 
Code beliefs, Reagan believed in more conflict-oriented tactics but more cooperative strategies.  
 As shown by the plunge in the Democrats’ Operational Code scores from 1980-1984, it is 
clear that the Democrats were not happy at all with Carter’s performance in the 1980 election. 
Therefore, for the 1984 election, the Democrats chose a candidate that saw the world through a 
Reagan-like pair of eyes on the fundamental level. It turns out that Reagan’s beliefs carried such 
a strong segment of the population that the Democrats found the need to imitate him with Walter 
Mondale. Although this attempt by Reagan’s opponents was unsuccessful, it further exemplifies 
how Reagan was able to divulge beliefs and rhetoric that were so relevant to the American 
electorate at that time.   
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CASE STUDY: THE INCUMBENTS 
INTRODUCTION  
 In general, incumbents tend gain a lot of benefits from their incumbency. In fact, it’s a 
candidate’s incumbency that makes them more likely to win their election. However, a 
candidate’s incumbency does not automatically determine a win or a loss for their re-election. A 
candidate must rely on what he has learned in office to make a plea to the electorate for why he 
deserves a second term. Incumbency also means a shift in rhetorical exigencies for the rhetor (the 
candidate). No longer is the candidate part of the opposition, trying to fight against someone else 
in office. He now has to use what he’s experienced and accomplished in office to defend the 
reason why he deserves another four years in office.  
Below is Figure 3, which contains the names and election years of incumbent candidates, 
whether they won or lost their re-election, and whether their mean scores for their values 
increased or decrease in value from their first election to the second. There were a few basic 
trends that will be described and asserted throughout this chapter. 
Candidate Win/Lose Incumbency P1 P2 P4 I1 I2 
Carter 
‘76/’80 Lose Increase Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
Reagan 
‘80/’84 Win Decrease Decrease  Increase  Decrease Increase  
H.W. Bush 
‘88/’92 Lose Increase  Increase  Decrease  Decrease Decrease  
Clinton 
‘92/’96 Win Decrease  Decrease Increase  Decrease Increase 
W. Bush 
‘00/’04 Win Decrease  Decrease  Stagnant  Decrease Decrease 
Obama 
‘08/’12 Win Increase Increase  Increase  Decrease  Decrease  
Figure 3 
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P1, P2, and P4 – Candidates Who Won their Re-Election, and Why 
Values P1, P2, and P4 can comfortable assert who won their re-elections and why others 
did not, depending on whether the candidates increased or decreased on these values. Reagan, 
Clinton, and W. Bush all won their re-election campaigns. Obama won his incumbent election as 
well, although his scores demonstrate an anomaly, which will be explained later in this chapter.   
This particular trend starts with a quick analysis of value P1, citing a candidate’s belief 
regarding the nature of the political universe. This belief reveals whether the candidate believes 
that the nature of the political universe is hostile or friendly. With Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush, 
they all show a decrease in the P1 value when comparing their mean scores for their first and re-
election campaigns. This means that all three candidates had thought that the nature of the 
political universe was more hostile than they did when they first stepped into office. Reagan had 
a P1 score .2250 in 1980, but the score dropped to .0650 in 1984. Clinton had a decrease in this 
score from 1991—1996, scoring .4733 to .4450, respectively. W. Bush had a decrease in his 
mean scores, scoring .4233 in 2000 to .2033 in 2004. Throughout their presidencies, these 
candidates’ views regarding this belief became increasingly hardened and pessimistic.   
These candidates, along with their decreased scores for P1, also show a decrease in value 
for P2. This means that at the same time that candidates were learning about a more hostile view 
of the universe, their pessimism regarding the realization of their political values increased. So, 
in other words, they might have attributed the non-accomplishment of their political goals to the 
external nature of the political universe. Reagan had a decrease in this value, scoring .0500 in 
1980 and .0350 in 1984. Clinton also had a decrease in his value from 1992-1996, scoring .2500  
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and .2450, respectively. Lastly, W. Bush had a decrease in this score, scoring .2133 in 2000 and 
.0776 in 2004.  
The value of P4 actually posits an opposite or almost stagnant reaction in relation to 
increases and decreases for values P1 and P2. This points to a rise in belief of historical control 
for Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush. In relation to the other values, this might come from an 
assumption that while the candidate might not have all of their political goals accomplished from 
a more hostile world, both external values, they still feel that their internal political efficacy is 
still high. Reagan’s scores illustrate this opposite increase, rising from .2650 in 1980 to .3300 in 
1984. Clinton’s scores also rise from 1992-1996 from .3133 to .3300. W. Bush’s scores are 
stagnant, staying motionless at .3667.  
This trend indicates winning values for the successful incumbents that carry this trend. 
The losing value of those that don’t follow this trend can be exemplified by H. W. Bush’s 
unsuccessful re-election campaign in 1992. 
Bush’s Unsuccessful Incumbent Election  
Bush did not win his re-election against Clinton in 1992. In accordance with the model 
mentioned above, this was because George H. W. Bush did not think that the nature of the 
political universe was more hostile after his first term in office, and that the he was increasingly 
optimistic about the realization of his political goals.  
For P1, Bush scored .3100 in 1988, and scored .3800 in 1992, meaning that Bush thought 
that the world was more friendly in 1992 than he did in 1988, which is different from the other 
incumbents that had won before and after him. In 1988, Bush’s debate rhetoric surrounded the 
idea of turning America into a “kinder and gentler nation” (cite?).  
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BUSH: Because I mean it when I say I want a kinder and gentler nation. This election is 
about big things. And perhaps the biggest is world peace. And I ask you to consider the 
experience I have had in working with a President who has revolutionized the situation 
around the world. America stands tall again, and as a result, we are credible. (CPD, 1988)  
It’s as if, in 1992, he really believed that he had created that “kinder and gentler” nation (CPD, 
1988), because in his eyes, rhetorically defending his presidential record, he believed that the 
nature of the political universe was friendlier.  
BUSH: I just thought of another…big difference here between me. I don't believe Mr. 
Perot feels this way, but I know Governor Clinton did because I want to accurately quote 
him. He thinks, I think he said, that the country is coming apart at the seams. Now, I 
know that the only way he can win is to make everybody believe the economy's worse 
than it is. But this country is not coming apart at the seams, for heaven's sakes. We're the 
United States of America. In spite of the economic problems, we're the most respected 
economy around the world. Many would trade for it. We've been caught up in a global 
slowdown. We can do much, much better, but we ought not try to convince the American 
people that America is a country that's coming apart at the seams. I would hate to be 
running for president and think that the only way I could win would be to convince 
everybody how horrible things are. Yes, there are big problems, and yes, people are 
hurting. But I believe that this Agenda for American renewal I have is the answer to do it, 
and I believe we can get it done now, whereas we didn't in the past, because you're going 
to have a whole brand new bunch of people in the Congress that are going to have to 
listen to the same American people I'm listening to. (CPD, 1988) 
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In a rhetorical situation where other incumbents have addressed a more hostile political universe, 
Bush denies it in the excerpt above. Slyly defending his own economic record as president, he 
tries to discredit his opponents by claiming that the economy is not as bad as their rhetoric 
portrays it to be. While he does recognize that “yes, there are big problems, and yes people are 
hurting,” the way that he masks it in saying that the economic situation is not as bad as portrayed 
to be was not cutting it for the American people. Since they were suffering through a bad 
economy at the time, their ears tended to perk more towards Clinton, who embraced the portrait 
of a bad economy in his opposing rhetoric against President Bush. 
For value P2, he scored .1050 in 1988 and .1833 in 1992. This reveals that Bush was 
more optimistic about the realization of his political values in 1992 than when he first stepped 
into the Oval Office in 1988. This makes sense in relation to his P1 score, that he thought that a 
somewhat friendly nature of the political universe was why he was more optimistic about the 
realization of his political values. It is, however, different from that of other winning incumbents.   
PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I think one thing that distinguishes is experience. I think 
we've dramatically changed the world. I'll talk about that a little bit later, but the changes 
are mind-boggling for world peace. Kids go to bed at night without the same fear of 
nuclear war. And change for change sake isn't enough. We saw that message in the late 
70s when heard a lot about change, and what happened, that misery index went right 
through the roof. But my economic program is the kind of change we want. And the way 
we're going to get it done is we're going to have a brand new Congress. A lot of them are 
thrown out because of all the scandals. I'll sit down with them, Democrats and 
Republicans alike, and work for my agenda for American renewal, which represents real 
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change. But I'd say, if you had to separate out, I think it's experience at this level. (CPD, 
1992) 
Since Bush believed during his re-election campaign that the political universe was friendlier 
than it was when he first walked into office, it makes sense that he believed that a friendlier 
world could result in the realization of his political values. Departing from the rhetoric of 
incumbents past and future, Bush’s confidence that he’s going to get “a brand new Congress,” 
due to external factors that “a lot of them are thrown out because of scandals,” which, he seems 
to think, works in his favor, seems to account a little bit for Bush’s increased optimism for the 
realization of his political values.  
For P4, Bush scored .4200 in 1988, and .3667 in 1992. Therefore, Bush believed that he 
had less control over historical development at re-election than he did on his first day of office. 
His P4 degree does decrease in opposite accordance with his P1 and P2 scores. This might have 
been because he had an opposite way of thinking than the other winning incumbent candidates, 
as he might have thought because there was a somewhat friendly political universe in which he 
could be optimistic that his political values would be realized, in which he didn’t have to rely on 
internal political efficacy.  
Barack Obama – The Incumbent Anomaly  
Unlike other incumbents, Obama did not have decreases for the values of P1 and P2, and 
did not have an opposite reaction in his value for P4. These trends for Obama’s scores are 
opposite in numbers and similar in pattern to that of his fellow successful incumbents, Reagan, 
Clinton, and W. Bush. Obama had an increase for the value of P1, scoring .2800 in 2008, and 
scoring .3467 in 2012.  Obama had an increase for the value of P2 as well, with a mean score of 
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.1133 in 2008, and a score of .1533 in 2012. Finally, for the value of P4, Obama had an increase 
in score, from .3033 in 2008 to .3200 in 2012. So, if Obama was had a successful incumbent re-
election just like Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush, why do his score increases for P1, P2, and P4 
act as anomalies?   
It starts off with the assumption that Obama had a similar rhetorical strategy as his other 
successful incumbent candidates during his first election. Like Reagan had rallied against Carter, 
like Clinton had rallied against H. W. Bush, and like W. Bush had rallied against Clinton, Obama 
had rallied against the lame-duck president, George W. Bush. Much of his campaign and debate 
surrounded the argument that, by electing his Republican opponent John McCain, that voters 
would be voting for a president that acted like George W. Bush 2.0. So, in regards to his “fight 
against” kind of rhetoric, Obama had begun at the same starting point as the other successful 
incumbent candidates.  Therefore, Obama’s anomalies do not begin with questioning his 
Operational Code scores in 2008, it begins with asking why they increased instead of decreased 
in 2012 when he ran for re-election.  
Even though all of the other successful incumbent presidents had a complicated exigence 
as presidents defending their records in office, Obama’s was slightly more complicated during 
his election in 2012. Like the other incumbents, Obama had to defend his presidential record, and 
ferociously establish and articulate why a Republican should not be elected over him as president 
at that time. Reagan did not have to do this to the degree of severity that Obama had to, as Walter 
Mondale was an easy opponent to fend off and shut down. Clinton was in the same boat. In terms 
of his presidential record, he portrayed it as a long list of achievements and accomplishments that 
deserved to be added to, and didn’t have to do too much damage to fend of Bob Dole in the 
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debates. Out of the other successful incumbents, Bush had to forcefully fend off Kerry in the 
wake of 9/11 and anti-war sentiments that Kerry was trying to capitalize on. So, if Obama had a 
similar exigence, why was it that Obama’s scores increased while Bush’s decreased?  
Obama had to portray a better America in his beliefs. He, like Reagan, continually asked 
voters, in the debates and on the campaign trail, if they were better off than they were four years 
ago. In order to stay true to that sentiment, he had to belief in a better world himself. The 
increases in Obama’s scores might have been the product about what Obama had already 
portrayed the world to be in 2008, and the increase in scores illustrates his attempt to bridge that 
gap with his rhetoric in 2012. Since he had pretty negative views regarding the Bush presidency 
in 2008, he had to make the point that he had actually made a difference in improving this 
negativity through his four years in office.  
His increase in the value for P1 illustrated that he believed that the nature of the political 
universe was more friendly as a result of the actions that he had taken as president in office. In 
2012, he stated:   
OBAMA: You know, four years ago we went through the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression. Millions of jobs were lost, the auto industry was on the brink of 
collapse. The financial system had frozen up. And because of the resilience and the 
determination of the American people, we've begun to fight our way back. Over the last 
30 months, we've seen 5 million jobs in the private sector created. The auto industry has 
come roaring back. And housing has begun to rise. But we all know that we've still got a 
lot of work to do. And so the question here tonight is not where we've been, but where 
we're going… Now, it ultimately is going to be up to the voters -- to you -- which path 
42  
we should take. Are we going to double on top-down economic policies that helped to get 
us into this mess or do we embrace a new economic patriotism that says America does 
best when the middle class does best? And I'm looking forward to having that debate. 
(CPD, 2012)  
In this statement, Obama strikes a very stark and deep contrast between the historic situation 
between the reasons why he was elected in 2008, and why he should be elected today in 2012. 
His values for P2 indicate the same trend, that he was more optimistic about the realization of his 
political values, due to what he felt that he had accomplished during his first time in office.  
 Obama’s score for P4 also increases, which is opposite to the trend that is apparent with 
the other successful incumbents. While other incumbents believed that their political efficacy 
had increased due to their more hostile views about the nature of the political universe and their 
increased pessimism regarding the realization of their political values, Obama held that the 
opposite was true. By the time of re-election, Obama had believed that the nature of the political 
universe had become friendlier, was more optimistic about the realization of his political values, 
and that he had increased control over historical development. Obama makes it very clear that 
he, as president, has accomplished certain achievements for the American people, and constantly 
attributes these achievements to himself. His plans for the future are also very centered on 
himself as well, as demonstrated by the statement from one of the 2012 debates below: 
OBAMA: When I walked into the Oval Office, I had more than a trillion-dollar deficit 
greeting me. And we know where it came from: two wars that were paid for on a credit 
card; two tax cuts that were not paid for; and a whole bunch of programs that were not 
paid for; and then a massive economic crisis. And despite that, what we've said is, yes, 
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we had to take some initial emergency measures to make sure we didn't slip into a Great 
Depression, but what we've also said is, let's make sure that we are cutting out those 
things that are not helping us grow…we went after medical fraud in Medicare and 
Medicaid very aggressively, more aggressively than ever before, and have saved tens of 
billions of dollars, $50 billion of waste taken out of the system. And I worked with 
Democrats and Republicans to cut a trillion dollars out of our discretionary domestic 
budget. That's the largest cut in the discretionary domestic budget since Dwight 
Eisenhower. Now, we all know that we've got to do more. And so I've put forward a 
specific $4 trillion deficit reduction plan. It's on a website. You can look at all the 
numbers, what cuts we make and what revenue we raise. And the way we do it is $2.50 
for every cut, we ask for $1 of additional revenue, paid for, as I indicated earlier, by 
asking those of us who have done very well in this country to contribute a little bit more 
to reduce the deficit. (CPD, 2012)  
In this statement, when clearly outlining how the deficit has been reduced, he attributes these 
steps to himself, demonstrating how he has directly affected historical development in regards to 
the reduction of the deficit.  
 As demonstrated, it is clear that Obama’s increased scores for values P1, P2, and P4 
between his election to office in 2008 and his re-election in 2012 are anomalies, but they show 
how his changing exigency and his rhetoric caused these increases. In 2008, Obama had painted 
a very dark picture of the United States with his rhetoric, and in 2012, as the defending 
incumbent president, had to put more optimistic faith in the situation that he had worked so hard 
to improve during his first term in office.  
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Conclusion  
As rhetors, incumbent presidents change during this period, due to the lessons that they 
have learned with their experience in office regarding their beliefs. Reagan, Clinton, and W. 
Bush showed a decrease in P1 between their first and second elections, signifying that they 
increasingly believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile. These three 
candidates also showed a decrease for P2, showing an increasing pessimism regarding the 
realization of their political values. This might be because the candidates might have attributed 
the non-accomplishment of their political goals to the increasingly hostile universe. These 
candidates also showed an increase for P4, meaning that they believed more in their effect on 
control over historical development. This might come from an assumption that while they might 
not have accomplished their goals as a result of a hostile political universe, their political 
efficacy still ranked very high.  
George H.W. Bush, who, in 1992, lost his re-election race, did not exhibit this winning 
pattern. In contrast to the other candidates, he believed that the nature of the political universe 
was friendlier, he was most optimistic about the realization of his political values, and that he 
had less control over historical development than he did when he first entered office.  
Obama’s score make his the anamoly of the successful incumbent presidential candidates. 
He exhibited an increase for P1, P2, and P4, meaning that he believed that the nature of the 
political universe was friendly, he was more optimistic about the realization of his political goals, 
and that he had a higher sense of historical development. This unique increase in scores was due 
to the fact that Obama’s rhetorical task was slightly different from that of Reagan, Clinton, or W. 
Bush. Since Obama’s rhetoric portrayed the historical situation so negatively in his first election 
45  
in 2008, he had to rhetorically craft a sentiment that the county was in a better place as an 
incumbent president.  
This trend outlining successful incumbent victories shows how presidents must shift their 
rhetoric from their first election to their re-election. It will certainly be interesting to learn if this 
incumbent trend regarding the relationship between the values of P1, P2, and P4 continues in the 
future, but if it does not, it is clear that this trend does shine light on the changing rhetoric of 
incumbent presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.   
46  
THE 2004 ELECTION CASE STUDY: THE CLOSE RHETORIC 
BETWEEN GEORGE W. BUSH AND JOHN KERRY 
INTRODUCTION  
The ultimate goal of campaign rhetoric is for candidates and their campaigns to match 
their rhetoric to the audience’s needs and expectations. While some presidential candidates miss 
the mark on rhetorically articulating their beliefs to their audience, John Kerry and George W. 
Bush were both spot on for their presidential debate rhetoric in 2004. The 2004 debates 
contained the closest mean scores across all values; P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2. Bush’s changes in 
beliefs as an incumbent in the 2004 election also illustrate well the change in exigence between 
elections, and Kerry’s similarities to Bush’s scores exemplify the Democrat’s ability to pick an 
effective challenger against their opponent. This case study is going to explain the scores and 
their similarities, and the significance of those similarities.  
The 2004 Election and the Candidate’s Exigence in Relation to Kairos  
Looking at the historical occurrences that surrounded the 2004 election, there was a very 
tight focus surrounding debate issues, which explains one reason for why the scores are so close. 
Right after the 2000 Presidential Elections, the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks occurred. Not long after, 
new-to-office President Bush declared a War on Terror, and proceeded to invade Afghanistan to 
hunt down Osama Bin Laden. Soon after, President George W. Bush invaded Iraq, calling for the 
urgent removal of Saddam Hussein, claiming that Iraq was harboring weapons of mass 
destruction. At first, the war was portrayed to be a quick and easy invasion, however, after it was 
found that there were no weapons of mass destruction to be found in Iraq or a foreseeable end 
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date to the war, the Iraq War turned sour in the eyes of the American electorate, creating a 
significant anti-war sentiment across the nation.   
These historical factors had creating a roaring kairotic exigence that was desperate for a 
response during the 2004 election. Since these international events were the most significant 
events that had occurred in the past four years, there was a tight focus on these issues during the 
presidential debates, which illustrates, in part, Bush’s and Kerry’s mean scores were so similar. 
According to the Commission on Presidential Debates, all three debates featured questions 
surrounding these foreign policy issues (CPD, 2012). 
Through a kairotic lens, in an immediate post-9/11 world, there was no room for a 
friendly view of the universe in the eyes of the American electorate—terrorism was abound and 
a fearful force to be reckoned with in the world. To match this sentiment, Bush and Kerry 
resonated this same message throughout their presidential debate rhetoric. While Bush portrayed 
himself as a decisive leader who would defend America against terrorism, Kerry tried to 
capitalize on the current anti-war sentiments (CPD, 2012). 
Bush and Kerry’s presidential debate rhetoric illustrate their successful use of kairos to 
resonate with their audience’s more fearful and cynical attitudes toward terrorism, as exemplified 
by the drop in mean scores for P1, P2, I1 and I2 dropped from 2000-2004. Essentially, this 
means that they both saw the nature of the political universe as more hostile, they were more 
pessimistic about the realization of political values, and they believed that more conflict-oriented 
strategies and tactics were necessary as a result of the post-9/11 era.  
In regards to the decrease for P1, nature of the political universe, it was clear that the 
candidates were responding to the kairotic exigence of living in a world more prone to terrorism, 
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revealing that they believed that the nature of the political universe was more hostile than in the 
2000 debates:  
BUSH: After 9/11, we had to look at the world differently. After 9/11, we had to 
recognize that when we saw a threat, we must take it seriously before it comes to hurt us. 
In the old days we’d see a threat, and we could deal with it if we felt like it or not. But 
9/11 changed it all. (CPD, 2004)    
As stated here, Bush depicts that the nature of the political universe has become more hostile 
because of the events that occurred on September 11th. As a result of a more hostile post-9/11 
world, this mean that cooperative strategies and tactics would no longer be enough to work in the 
real world or to satisfy the American people, which is why the candidates chose to use rhetoric 
that echoed this conflict-minded sentiment.  
The decrease for I1 and I2 can be accounted for the fact that terrorism increased the need 
for a more conflict-oriented world strategy and tactics, war (as opposed to a more cooperative 
strategy or tactic, like diplomacy).  
BUSH: And I saw a unique threat in Saddam Hussein, as did my opponent, because we 
thought he had weapons of mass destruction. And the unique threat was that he could 
give weapons of mass destruction to an organization like Al Qaida, and the harm they 
inflicted on us with airplanes would be multiplied greatly by weapons of mass 
destruction. And that was the serious, serious threat. So I tried diplomacy, went to the 
United Nations. But as we learned in the same report I quoted, Saddam Hussein was 
gaming the oil-for-food program to get rid of sanctions. He was trying to get rid of 
sanctions for a reason: He wanted to restart his weapons programs. We all thought there 
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were weapons there, Robin. My opponent thought there were weapons there. That's why 
he called him a grave threat. (CPD, 2004)  
In this statement, Bush expresses his belief that diplomacy was not working well enough in his 
dealings with Saddam Hussein, hinting that further action was necessary. Like Bush’s statement 
above, Kerry leaned more toward war, a conflict-based strategy and tactic, in his sentiments as 
well. Rhetorically, both were responding to the need for conflict-oriented strategies in this more 
hostile environment, exhibiting qualities that the American people wanted in a president at the 
time.  
George W. Bush: Learning the Consequences of 9/11 in Office 
 The 2004 debates also showcased how incumbent candidates “learn” after spending their 
first term in office. While all presidents in the study showed that they had “learned” throughout 
their time in office, the September 11th attacks had taught President George W. Bush to look at 
the world from a more cynical perspective. For all belief values, George W. Bush’s scores had 
significant decreases. His P1 values had dropped from .4233 to .2033, a difference of .22. His P2 
values had decreased from .2133 to .0767, a difference of .1366. His P4 values had remained the 
same at .3367. His I1 values had dropped from .5933 to .4267, a difference of .1666. Finally, his 
I2 values had decreased, from .2500 to .1867, a difference of .0633. By the time that the 2004 
elections had come around, President Bush believed that the universe had changed for the worst 
since 2000.  
He believed that the political universe was more hostile, and that he had less control over 
historical development before. During the 2000 presidential debates, he stated:  
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BUSH: First question is what's in the best interests of the United States? What's in the 
best interests of our people? When it comes to foreign policy that will be my guiding 
question. Is it in our nation's interests? Peace in the Middle East is in our nation's 
interests. Having a hemisphere that is free for trade and peaceful is in our nation's 
interests. Strong relations in Europe is in our nation's interest. I've thought a lot about 
what it means to be the president. I also understand that an administration is not one 
person, but an administration is dedicated citizens who are called by the president to 
serve the country, to serve a cause greater than self, and so I've thought about an 
administration of people who represent all America, but people who understand my 
compassionate and conservative philosophy. (CPD, 2000)  
In 2004, his stance had become more hostile:  
BUSH: This nation of ours has got a solemn duty to defeat this ideology of hate. And 
that's what they are. This is a group of killers who will not only kill here, but kill children 
in Russia, that'll attack unmercifully in Iraq, hoping to shake our will. We have a duty to 
defeat this enemy. We have a duty to protect our children and grandchildren. The best 
way to defeat them is to never waver, to be strong, to use every asset at our disposal, is to 
constantly stay on the offensive and, at the same time, spread liberty. (CPD, 2004)  
It’s obvious that the presidency gave George W. Bush a much different, more hostile view of the 
world. As demonstrated by the debate rhetoric above, in 2000, Bush talked about a less hostile 
environment, speaking of peace in terms of our national interest. This is drastically different 
from the stance he developed after his post-9/11 presidency in 2004, where he speaks of “an 
ideology of hate,” and a motivation to defeat the enemy.  George W. Bush had been able to take 
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what he had learned during his first term in office and rhetorically articulated these newfound 
beliefs of a more hostile world to win the 2004 election.  
He was also more pessimistic about the prospects for the realization of his political 
values, and now believed that conflict-oriented strategies and tactics were the most effective ones 
in the universe.  
BUSH: I agree with him. The world is better off without Saddam Hussein. I was hoping 
diplomacy would work. I understand the serious consequences of committing our troops 
into harm's way. It's the hardest decision a president makes. So I went to the United 
Nations. I didn't need anybody to tell me to go to the United Nations. I decided to go 
there myself. And I went there hoping that, once and for all, the free world would act in 
concert to get Saddam Hussein to listen to our demands. They passed the resolution that 
said, "Disclose, disarm, or face serious consequences." I believe, when an international 
body speaks, it must mean what it says. Saddam Hussein had no intention of disarming. 
Why should he? He had 16 other resolutions and nothing took place. As a matter of fact, 
my opponent talks about inspectors. The facts are that he was systematically deceiving 
the inspectors. That wasn't going to work. That's kind of a pre-September 10th mentality, 
the hope that somehow resolutions and failed inspections would make this world a more 
peaceful place. He was hoping we'd turn away. But there was fortunately others beside 
myself who believed that we ought to take action. (CPD, 2004).  
One reason for Bush’s increased pessimism regarding the realization of his political values is his 
articulated experiences with the United Nations in dealing with Saddam Hussein. In this 
experience, it’s clear that his political values were not realized to his satisfaction. As a result, he 
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rhetorically articulated his desire for more conflict-oriented tactics and strategies where he says 
that “there were others beside myself that believed that we ought to take action.” This excerpt 
further illustrates the increases in Bush’s pessimism regarding this value, as he had learned 
during his time in office that cooperative-oriented strategies and tactics were not enough to see 
his political values realized in office.   
John Kerry: The Embodiment of Kairos Himself  
John Kerry, as a candidate himself, embodies kairos as a rhetor. In order to properly meet 
the needs of an American electorate who saw the world just as cynically as President Bush did, 
the Democrats needed someone who was well-versed in foreign policy, who could echo these 
same sentiments, as well as have the capability to credibly criticize the President’s misguidance 
in handling the major events in his presidency that caused these sentiments in the first place. In 
order to fulfill the need of the “foreign-policy president” in a post-9/11 world, the Democrats 
thought that it would be wisest to choose Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts as their 
candidate. Kerry, a celebrated and experienced war veteran and Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, was one of the most qualified foreign-policy experts in the Democratic 
Party (this still stands today, as he currently serves as Secretary of State under President Barack 
Obama). The similar of mean scores between John Kerry and George W. Bush exemplify the 
Democrats’ extraordinary effort in picking a candidate who could give their opponent a healthy 
source of opposition during the debates and the election.   
  While Kerry was very closely matched with President Bush in mean belief scores, he 
might have rhetorically overshot his cynicism, citing his overall loss in the election. For every 
value except for P4, his belief in historical control, he had scored lower mean scores than Bush. 
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Kerry’s overshot cynicism lies in his exigence in trying to rhetorically defeat President Bush. As 
President, George W. Bush’s exigency had the task of responding to a cynical world, but one in 
which he was still able to lead. Kerry’s exigence had the harder task of responding to a more 
hostile world and criticizing the president’s actions in addressing that hostile world, leaving him 
little room to do much else in his presidential debate rhetoric.  
Kerry rhetorically articulated that he believed that the nature of the political universe was 
more hostile than Bush, just under by .0266.  
KERRY: Now, how do we achieve it is the most critical component of it. I believe that 
this president, regrettably, rushed us into a war, made decisions about foreign policy, 
pushed alliances away. And, as a result, America is now bearing this extraordinary 
burden where we are not as safe as we ought to be. The measurement is not: Are we 
safer? The measurement is: Are we as safe as we ought to be? And there are a host of 
options that this president had available to him, like making sure that at all our ports in 
America containers are inspected. Only 95 percent of them -- 95 percent come in today 
uninspected. That's not good enough. People who fly on airplanes today, the cargo hold is 
not X-rayed, but the baggage is. That's not good enough. Firehouses don't have enough 
firefighters in them. Police officers are being cut from the streets of America because the 
president decided to cut the COPS program. So we can do a better job of homeland 
security. I can do a better job of waging a smarter, more effective war on terror and 
guarantee that we will go after the terrorists. (CPD, 2004)  
In the excerpt above, it is obvious that Kerry is spread pretty thin with the amount of things that 
his exigence has to respond to in this one passage. Kerry has a very complicated exigence, as he 
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has to refute the President’s record and contrast it with his own stance and policies of how he 
would do better, also while resonating with the American people as he articulates his beliefs. 
This complicated exigence is illustrated many times in the statement above where Kerry first sets 
up his rhetoric by portraying a country in need (“America is not as safe as it ought to be”), 
presenting an alternative option to the American people (“The measurement is, ‘Are we as safe 
as we ought to be?’”), contrasting himself from the president (“not good enough”), and 
establishing himself as the alternative leader (“I can do a better job of waging a smarter, more 
effective war on terror…”). This was an awful lot for Kerry to exude in less than a moment’s 
time, illustrating why his multi-faceted exigence essentially bogged him down in the rhetorical 
articulation of his beliefs, portraying himself as the more negative candidate in this aspect.  
Kerry’s P2 values were only .0100 lower than Bush’s, and his I2 values were only .0034 
lower than Bush’s scores, exhibiting only slightly more pessimism regarding the realization of 
his political values and conflict-oriented tactics than President Bush.  
KERRY: I can make American safer than President Bush has made us. And I believe 
President Bush and I both love our country equally. But we just have a different set of 
convictions about how you make America safe. I believe America is safest and strongest 
when we are leading the world and we are leading strong alliances. I'll never give a veto 
to any country over our security. But I also know how to lead those alliances. This 
president has left them in shatters across the globe, and we're now 90 percent of the 
casualties in Iraq and 90 percent of the costs. I think that's wrong, and I think we can do 
better. I have a better plan for homeland security. I have a better plan to be able to fight 
the war on terror by strengthening our military, strengthening our intelligence, by going 
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after the financing more authoritatively, by doing what we need to do to rebuild the 
alliances, by reaching out to the Muslim world, which the president has almost not done, 
and beginning to isolate the radical Islamic Muslims, not have them isolate the United 
States of America. I know I can do a better job in Iraq. I have a plan to have a summit 
with all of the allies, something this president has not yet achieved, not yet been able to 
do to bring people to the table. We can do a better job of training the Iraqi forces to 
defend themselves, and I know that we can do a better job of preparing for elections. 
(CPD, 2004) 
Again, this cynicism comes from the fact that Kerry’s complicated exigence had multiple tasks—
refuting the president, promoting his own presidential agenda, and resonating with the American 
electorate. He even started off the above opening statement by immediately contrasting himself 
with President Bush. Every time he mentioned a “better plan,” or a “better job,” he was trying to 
strike Bush within his rhetoric. It was in this way that Kerry had to out-bet the President with his 
beliefs, since he figured that simply matching George W. Bush in his rhetoric was not going to 
be enough. Kerry’s score, slightly lower than Bush’s, exemplifies his struggle with his exigence 
in this way.  
It seems, according to the data, that Kerry’s extra degree of cynicism held the key to 
President Bush’s successes in the election. Interestingly enough, however, John Kerry won the 
two debates that Bush had lost, the third debate between them resulting in a tie.  
Conclusion  
The 2004 Presidential Debates illustrate just how closely George W. Bush and John 
Kerry were able to match their exigence to the kairos of the post-9/11 world.  
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The September 11th Terrorist Attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the War on Iraq 
created a roaring exigence and tight focus that the candidates were eager to respond to during the 
2004 presidential debates. In responding to this exigence, the candidates tailored their beliefs to 
match the kairos of the time, which was more hostile and pessimistic than it was in 2004. These 
historical events had caused a decrease in all scores, P1, P2, P4, I1 and I2, which spawned from 
the negative rhetoric articulated about these events. Both Bush and Kerry saw the nature of the 
political universe as more hostile, they both were more pessimistic about the realization of the 
their political goals, and they believed that more conflict-oriented strategies were necessary in a 
post-9/11 era.  
Bush, the defending incumbent President, had taken the pessimistic lessons he had 
learned in office, and used it to win re-election as the President who would lead the country 
through these difficult times, which explains his decreases in scores across the board. Kerry 
embodied kairos as a presidential candidate, being one of the most qualified and electable 
foreign policy experts in the Democratic Party, he was able to echo Bush’s concerns about living 
in a post-9/11 world while credibly criticizing his incumbent opponent. Even though Kerry’s 
scores were very similar to Bush’s it seems that Kerry overshot his cynicism due to his 
complicated exigence in the 2004 debates, citing his loss in the 2004 election.  
Both Kerry and Bush were highly accurate in their ability to capitalize on the kairotic 
beliefs and events of the 2004 election, something that was never accomplished in the debates 
that took place before their election or after. 
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INDEPENDENTS: JOHN ANDERSON AND ROSS PEROT, AND THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a very dominating two party system. As a result, independents tend 
to be left out or pushed to the side of major party candidates for a couple of reasons. First, when 
independents run as candidates in presidential election, their popular ideas get swallowed or 
stolen by the major party candidates. It is in this way that independents pull major party 
candidates more to the left or to the right, but this ends up harming independents in their own 
candidacy. In addition, independent candidates tend to take away votes from each of the major 
party candidates.  
             In studying the Operational Codes of independent presidential candidates John B. 
Anderson and Ross Perot, it further proved that third party candidates don’t work well in the US 
two-party system because they are either not mainstream enough or rhetorically accurate enough 
to win. John B. Anderson’s Operational Code beliefs had rhetorically missed the mark compared 
to the Operational Codes of his major party candidates. Ross Perot’s Operational Code mean 
scores, which often fell between those of his major-party opponents, illustrated how he was able 
to take away some of his major-party opponents’ voting population, but not to a high enough 
degree to win the presidency.   
John B. Anderson: Rhetorically Missing the Mark  
John B. Anderson was a representative in the U.S. House for his district in Illinois. 
Although he was originally a Republican during his time in the House, he declared himself as an 
Independent for the 1980 presidential election, and made it onto the ballot in all fifty states. 
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Anderson’s candidacy and platform were considered to be right-winged, but not as much as 
ultra-conservative Reagan. John B. Anderson received 6.61% of the vote, while Democrat and 
incumbent President Jimmy Carter won 41.04% of the vote and 7 states, and Republican winner 
Ronald Reagan won 50.75% of the vote and 43 states. 
Jimmy Carter, the Democratic incumbent, had spent four years in office. Many in the 
electorate had thought that Carter had handled the Iran Hostage crisis in a terrible manner 
(Abramson et al., 1982). In addition to the hostage crisis, a poor economy had emerged during 
Carter’s presidency, resulting in inflation and high unemployment rates (Abramson et al., 1982). 
According to Abramson et al., Carter tried to defend his position in office by giving off vibe that 
“Reagan is awful. Don’t vote for him’” (1982). Reagan, the Republican challenger, heavily 
criticized the Carter presidency, claiming that “’Carter was a failure, but I will do better. Here is 
my program. It is different from his, so you know that I will not repeat the same mistakes’” 
(Abramson et. al, 1982). As the Independent candidate, Anderson had to foster a position 
between the two major party candidates, portraying himself as “different from and preferable to 
both Reagan and Carter (Abramson et al., 1982).  
ANDERSON: President Carter was not right a few weeks ago when he said that the 
American people were confronted with only two choices, with only two men, and with 
only two parties. I think you've seen tonight in this debate that Governor Reagan and I 
have agreed on exactly one thing - we are both against the reimposition of a peacetime 
draft. We have disagreed, I believe, on virtually every other issue. I respect him for 
showing tonight - for appearing here, and I thank the League of Women Voters for the 
opportunity that they have given me. I am running for President as an Independent 
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because I believe our country is in trouble. I believe that all of us are going to have to 
begin to work together to solve our problems. (CPD, 1980).  
Anderson’s strategy might have not been the best idea, as most of his Operational Code scores 
were way off from those his fellow major-party opponents. Reflecting upon the percentage of the 
vote that he received from the American electorate, it is clear that his strategy of trying to stand 
out from his major party opponents left him out in the cold instead. This was because, in regards 
to kairos, the American electorate was looking for a conservative like Reagan to replace Carter, 
as they were dissatisfied with his performance in office. Anderson had the easy task of speaking 
with an exigence that separated himself from liberal Carter, but also had to distinguish himself 
from also-conservative Reagan in the same exigence—a much more difficult task. By putting 
himself in a place that distanced himself from both candidates, even the one favored by the 
audience in terms of kairos, Anderson ended up articulating beliefs that did not resonate with the 
American electorate in a manner that was appropriate to their needs, wants and expectations in a 
president at the time.  
Anderson’s belief in his ability to control historical development, much different than 
that of Carter’s and Reagans, did not sit well with the American electorate. Anderson’s mean 
score for P4, .3200 falls way above Reagan’s and Carter’s scores, .2650 and .1700 respectively. 
Even though Anderson was ideologically close to conservative Reagan, he was very different on 
this value from his Republican counterpart. Anderson’s high belief and articulation of his own 
control of historical development shows that he was rhetorically “off” on this value.  
ANDERSON: I believe that all of us are going to have to begin to work together to solve 
our problems…and therefore, I think you ought to consider doing something about it, and 
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voting for an Independent in 1980. You know, a generation of office seekers has tried to 
tell the American people that they could get something for nothing. It's been a time, 
therefore, of illusion and false hopes, and the longer it continues, the more dangerous it 
becomes. We've got to stop drifting. 
By asking the American people to “do something about it,” he’s rhetorically reflecting his own 
values on the American people, implying that he’s going to “do something about it” and blow 
past the “generation of office seekers that [have told] the American people that they could get 
something for nothing” like major-party candidates Carter and Reagan. In this way, Anderson 
was over-compensating for his desire to stand out, because he wasn’t exactly on point about 
major parties. As illustrated by the statement above, it was clear that he thought that the 
American people did not want a major party candidate at all—but the truth was, they weren’t fed 
up with the major party system just yet, it’s just that they desperately wanted someone else in 
office.  
Other scores which illustrate Anderson’s failed attempt of standing from the major party 
candidates are his mean scores for I1 and I2, citing his beliefs for the approach and pursuit of 
goals, respectively. Anderson’s mean score for I1 of .5800 is way, way above Reagan’s (.3700) 
and Carter’s (.3700), which had an identical mean score for this value. This shows that the 
parties and candidates hit this value right on the money in terms of audience, believing and 
saying that a somewhat cooperative-oriented strategy was the best in the universe. On the other 
hand, it shows that Anderson’s belief that a very cooperative-oriented strategy was the best in the 
universe, his belief as an independent candidate that did not resonate with the mainstream 
American electorate. Anderson’s mean score for I2, .1900, is a little above Reagan’s mean score 
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of .1050 and Carter’s mean score of .1200, which are pretty close together. While Reagan and 
Carter were relatively close in believing that less cooperative tactics were most effective at the 
time, Anderson was not mainstream enough in believing that somewhat cooperative tactics what 
were most effective for the time period.  
Anderson’s score for P2, the prospects for the realization of his political values, actually 
falls in-between those of his major-party opponents. Anderson’s mean score, .1800, falls right 
between Carter’s at .3600 and Reagan’s at .0500. While Carter was optimistic about the 
prospects for the realization of his political values, Reagan was almost pessimistic. While it’s 
possible that Carter’s optimism in this regard could be a factor in the debates that relates to his 
loss in the election, it was Anderson’s in-between attitude on this belief that did not resonate well 
with the American electorate.  
ANDERSON: When these Presidential Debates were held just four years ago, I 
remember the incumbent President, who was willing to debate, President Ford, telling the 
American people that they simply ought not to vote for somebody who promised more 
than they could deliver. Well, we've seen what has happened. We haven't gotten either 
the economies in Government that were promised; we haven't gotten the 4% inflation that 
we were supposed to get at the end of Mr. Carter's first term. Instead we had, I think, in 
the second quarter, a Consumer Price Index registering around 12%. And nobody really 
knows, with the latest increase in the Wholesale Price Index - that's about 18% on an 
annualized basis - what it's going to be. Let me say this. I think my programs are far less 
inflationary than those of Governor Reagan…I've been very careful - I have been very 
careful in saying that what I'm going to do is to bring Federal spending under control 
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first. I would like to stand here and promise the American people a tax cut, as Governor 
Reagan has done. But, you know, it's gotten to be about $122 difference. Somebody 
worked it out. And they figured out that between the tax cut that Governor Reagan is 
promising the American people, and the tax cut that Jimmy Carter is promising in 198I, 
his is worth about $122 more. So you, dear voters, are out there on the auction block, and 
these two candidates are bidding for your votes. And one is going to give you $122 more 
if you happen to be in that range of about a $20,000-a-year income. I'm going to wait 
until I see that that inflation rate is going down, before I even begin to phase in the 
business tax cuts that I've talked about. But I think, by improving productivity, they 
would be far less inflationary than the consumption-oriented tax cut that Governor 
Reagan is recommending. 
In this passage, Anderson basically tried to lay himself in a position between that of Carter and 
Reagan by saying that he is not going to bring federal spending under control until the inflation 
rate comes down. However, this plan did not resonate well with the American people because the 
third option he provided is one that said, “wait and see.” The American people did not think that 
they had time for a “wait and see” kind of plan to control federal spending, they wanted a plan of 
action that was different from Carter’s which was why voters chose Reagan for the Presidency.  
The only value that held Anderson relatively close to a major party candidate was P1, 
citing his belief about the nature of the political universe. Anderson’s mean score for P1, .2500, 
came close to Reagan’s score of .2250, which were both well below Carter’s mean score 
of.5000. This exhibits how Anderson was ideologically conservative like Reagan, who both saw 
the nature of the political universe as more hostile than Carter. 
63  
The Operational Code scores of independent John B. Anderson show that this belief 
rhetorically missed the mark for the election of 1980. As an independent, Anderson’s beliefs 
were not mainstream enough to win a significant amount of votes from the American electorate, 
further illustrating how independent candidates do not work well in the United States’ 
dominating two-party system.   
Ross Perot: Not Enough to Win the Presidency  
Ross Perot was an American businessman from Texas that decided to run for office as an 
independent in 1992. Perot’s campaign and rhetoric capitalized on the American electorate’s fear 
of the looming deficit, as well as his independence from the Democratic and Republican parties. 
He ran as an independent candidate in 1992 against Democrat Bill Clinton and Republican 
incumbent President George H. W. Bush. Perot was able to get his name on the ballot in all 50 
states. Perot ended up receiving 19% of the popular vote, while Bush received 37% of the vote, 
and Clinton won with 43% of the vote (Abramson et al., 1995). Perot was one of the main 
deciding factors that made Bill Clinton one of the few presidents to actually win the presidency 
with less than 50% of the vote (Abramson et al., 1995). Perot’s substantial share of the popular 
vote had taken away votes from the two major party candidates, but not enough to become the 
first independent president.  
George H. W. Bush, the Republican incumbent, had a relatively good first term as 
president. He had done a good job with the Persian Gulf War, and had high approval ratings at 
the time (Abramson et al., 1995). The only problem was, the 1992 elections were more focused 
on domestic issues, such as the economy, leaving little chance for Bush to shine in his area of 
expertise, foreign policy. The public had fears about the looming federal budget deficit, and the 
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economy worsened as Election Day drew closer (Abramson et al., 1995). Clinton and Perot were 
able to capitalize their campaign rhetoric around the deficit, Clinton citing his famous tagline, 
“It’s the economy, stupid!” while providing a plan to lessen the gap between the rich the poor, 
while Perot was able to use his stance as a successful businessman to speak out against NAFTA 
and the national debt (Abramson et. Al, 1995). While Perot’s Operational Code scores showed 
that he was definitely mainstream enough in the eyes of the American electorate, it appears that 
he was not rhetorically accurate enough to win the election.  
             Perot’s Operational Code score for P1, citing his belief in the nature of the political 
universe, illustrate this sentiment. Perot’s mean score of .4000 falls between Clinton’s score of 
.4733 and Bush’s score .3800, meaning that his beliefs and rhetoric were not off the chart’s like 
Anderson’s. However, Perot’s score is closer to Bush’s score than Clinton’s. Perot and Bush saw 
the political universe much more hostile than Clinton did, which is why they both lost the 
election. 
PEROT: But I just find it fascinating that while we sit here tonight we will go into debt 
an additional $50 million in an hour and a half. Now, it's not the Republicans' fault, of 
course, and it's not the Democrats' fault. And what I'm looking for is who did it? Now, 
they're the 2 folks involved so maybe if you put them together, they did it. Now, the facts 
are we have to fix it. I'm here tonight for these young people up here in the balcony from 
this college. When I was a young man, when I got out of the Navy I had multiple job 
offers. Young people with high grades can't get a job. People -- the 18- to 24-year-old 
high school graduates 10 years ago were making more than they are now. In other words, 
we were down to 18% of them were making -- 18- to 24-year- olds were making less than 
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$12,000. Now that's up to 40%. And what's happened in the meantime? The dollar's gone 
through the floor. Now, whose fault is that? Not the Democrats. Not the Republicans. 
Somewhere out there there's an extraterrestrial that's doing this to us, I guess. And 
everybody says they take responsibility. Somebody somewhere has to take responsibility 
for this. Put it to you bluntly, American people. If you want me to be your president, 
we're going to face our problems. We’ll deal with our problems, we’ll solve our 
problems. We'll down our debt. We'll pass on the American dream to our children, and I 
will not leave our children a situation that they have today. When I was a boy it took 2 
generations to double the standard of living. Today it will take 12 generations. Our 
children will not see the American dream because of this debt that somebody somewhere 
dropped on us. (CPD, 1992)  
By contrasting what the world was like when he “was a young man” to the current economic 
situation, Perot is exemplifying that the nature of the political universe is more hostile than it 
used to be, resulting in the current economic plight. Even though he uses this contrast to put 
down the two major parties (and sarcastically, the “extraterrestrials”) and raise himself up as the 
“above politics” solution to America’s economic problems, the fact that he still portrays the 
nature of the political universe as more hostile attributes to his loss in the election.  
The results are similar for Perot’s standings for P2, his beliefs regarding the realization of 
his political values. Perot’s mean score for P2, .2000, falls between Clinton’s mean score of 
.2500 and Bush’s score of .1833, but again, is closer to Bush’s score than it is to Clinton’s. This 
shows that as an independent candidate, Perot was close in appealing to this value, but was not 
close enough, as his opponents had scores that were more polarized. Clinton’s score, being the 
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highest of the three candidates, showed that he was the most optimistic about the prospects for 
the realization of his political values. Illustrated by the fact that Perot’s was closer to Bush’s 
score, the lowest of all three candidates, it was clear that Perot’s score might have been moderate 
and not “off,” but his optimism was not as high as Clinton’s. Rhetorically, with an economy that 
was worsening, Clinton’s optimism in this regard was what the American people needed in a 
president.  
For I1, Perot’s scores again illustrate his mainstream qualities but also illustrate how he 
did not win the election with his beliefs regarding the approach of goals. I1 had the largest range 
out of all of the values for the 1992 election, with Clinton at the top of the range and Bush on the 
bottom, and Perot in the middle. Perot’s mean score of .4767 falls right between Clinton’s score 
of .5833 and Bush’s score of .2433. In this case, it’s not like Perot is off on this score, it’s just 
that he did not believe that a cooperation-oriented strategy was effective to the effect that Clinton 
did, illustrating why voters might have gravitated more towards Clinton than they did to Perot.  
             Perot’s scores for the pursuit of goals are very much like his scores for other values. 
Perot’s mean score of .1733 falls between Clinton’s score of .2533 and Bush’s score of .0633, 
but is slightly closer to Clinton’s. Like the mean scores for I1, the mean scores for I2 have a 
large range, with Clinton on top, Perot in the middle, and Bush on the bottom. Again, Perot was 
able to position himself as someone who believed that somewhat cooperative strategies were the 
most effective in the universe to a degree that was in between the Democrat and the Republican 
opponents, but apparently, it was not enough.  
PEROT: If the American people want to do it and not talk about it, then they ought to -- 
you know, I'm one person they ought to consider. If they just want to keep slow dancing 
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and talk about it and not do it, I'm not your man. I am results-oriented. I am action 
oriented. I've dealt my businesses. Getting things done in three months that my 
competitors took 18 months to do. Everybody says you can't do that with Congress. Sure, 
you can do that with Congress. Congress -- they're all good people. They're all patriots 
but you've got to link arms and work with them. Sure, you'll have arguments. Sure, you'll 
have fights. We have them all day every day. But we get the job done. 
This statement is not very out of the ordinary from other generic campaign stump speeches of 
presidential candidates, talking about getting rid of the gridlock in Congress in order to get 
something done. During an election where the economy was in bad shape, the American 
electorate wanted something to be done, and felt that there wasn’t enough time to a president that 
would argue back and forth with Congress. Therefore, while Perot’s statement above is powerful, 
it does not set him above or apart from the other candidates.  
P4 was the only value for which Perot did not score between the two major-party 
candidates. Perot’s score of .2667 falls way below Clinton’s score of .3133 and Bush’s score of 
.3667. Like Anderson, Perot was way off on portraying this value through his beliefs and his 
rhetoric because his score on this value was much lower than those of the scores of his major-
party counterparts. In this way, Perot was not able to appeal enough to the kairos of that election. 
 Perot’s Operational Code scores illustrate how mainstream his ideas were to the 
American electorate at the time, but also why he did not end up winning the election of 1992.  
Conclusion: The Difference Between Anderson and Perot   
Major-party candidates usually count on their political parties to hustle votes for them, by 
way of providing a familiar ideology that voters can relate to, money, resources, and experts. To 
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major-party candidates, these things are considered to be automatic, but independents must 
provide these things for themselves. Therefore, while major-party candidates can coast by during 
elections on things other than their beliefs and ideas, beliefs and ideas are what set the 
independents apart from their major-party candidates.   
For John B. Anderson, his beliefs deterred people from voting from him. Anderson 
received 6.61% of the vote, and zero states. He ran against incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter 
and Republican Ronald Reagan. As an independent candidate, Anderson had to rhetorically 
separate himself from his two major-party opponents. As exemplified by most of his mean scores 
for the Operational Code belief values, it’s obvious that his beliefs were not rhetorically ready 
for the time period. Anderson’s scores for P4, I1, and I2 were rhetorically far off from both 
Carter’s and Reagan’s scores. Anderson’s belief scores exhibit that he rhetorically missed the 
mark in terms of kairos and audience. 
As for Perot, his beliefs were not “off” like Anderson’s—Perot was able to rhetorically 
and kairotically match his beliefs to the audience during the election of 1992, however, it just 
wasn’t enough to win him the presidency. Perot had earned 19% of the vote during his run for 
office, and similarly, his Operational Code scores were much more mainstream than Anderson’s. 
Perot, running again Republican incumbent George H.W. Bush and Democratic challenger Bill 
Clinton, had crafted his rhetoric to capitalize on America’s fears about the looming deficit. 
Perot’s Operational Code Scores for values P1, P2, I1, and I2 fell between those of Bush’s and 
Clinton’s. While his rhetoric was certainly kairotic and mainstream, it was not enough for him to 
win the election.  
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With both of these candidates, it seems that their beliefs were not rhetorically matched 
enough for the audience to vote to disrupt the long-dominant two-party system of the United 
States. Anderson’s beliefs left him out in the cold compared to his major-party opponents, 
causing him to receive 6.61% of the vote. While Perot was able to rock the boat with his 19% of 
the vote, he did not receive enough votes to tip the boat over. These results further prove that 
independent candidates do not work well the United States’ dominant two-party system. Both 
Anderson and Perot were not able to become the first non-major-party candidate to win the 
presidency, and the rhetorical articulations of their beliefs illustrate one factor in that result.  
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CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this research project, I set out to find 1) what beliefs were apparent 
and consistent over time, 2) if beliefs were exclusive to party lines, and 3) whether winners and 
losers of debates have similar beliefs. The answers that I found were clear cut and simple.  
The answers that I found were clear-cut and simple: In examining the evolution of beliefs from 
1976-2012, it was found that belief values rose and fell together for almost every election, with 
only some anomalies. In examining whether Democratic and Republican candidates have similar 
operational code scores in-party, it was found that scores are not consistent on the basis of party. 
In other words, scores rose and fell together in terms of party lines. In finding out of there were 
certain beliefs that all debate and elections winners or losers share, it was evident that 
presidential candidates were all over the map—in other words, there was no specific evidence 
from the operational code scores that could necessarily determine a winner or loser of a debate, 
or the election.  
However, finding the answers to these questions did not constitute the end of the quest to 
examine Operational Code beliefs as articulated in presidential debates by presidential 
candidates. These answers gave way to more detailed, more thought-provoking questions about 
the rise and fall of beliefs during election cycles. In studying the candidacy of Ronald, it was 
found that Reagan’s electoral victories were so significant that other opponents tried to match on 
certain belief levels, but still came up short. In studying the incumbent candidates in this study, it 
was found that incumbents comfortably had similar score patterns regarding the relationships 
between their mean scores for P1, P2, and P4, citing their view of the nature of the political 
universe, their optimism or pessimism regarding the nature of political values, and their sense of 
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control over historical development. Lastly, the study of the two independent candidates in the 
study, John B. Anderson and Ross Perot, further proved through Operational Code beliefs the 
reasons why independent presidential candidates don’t succeed in the dominating two-party 
system of the United States. In studying the 2004 election between John Kerry and George W. 
Bush, it was found that these two candidates had the closest rhetoric of all of the election cycles 
due to their rhetorical articulations regarding the post-9/11 era, but since Kerry overshot his 
rhetorical cynicism in expressing his beliefs, Bush came out on top.  
 Still, there are many questions left unanswered throughout these case studies regarding 
the relationship between rising and falling Operational Code scores and the rhetorical situation. 
Options for further study could include looking at the difference in scores that candidates had 
from individual debate to debate, post-Cold War era rhetoric and how that impacted the 
Operational Code scores of candidates in those elections, and how the integrity and receptivity of 
certain candidates affected the way in which they scored for certain values of the Operational 
Code.  
Rhetoric and beliefs are two major driving factors in presidential debates and campaigns. 
Pulling from the rhetorical situation of each election, presidential candidates have been able to 
successfully win the presidency based on their beliefs and their rhetoric. Presidential debates add 
to this rhetoric momentum, allowing candidates to express their viewpoint, and more 
importantly, the chance to triumph over their opponent. By examining Operational Code scores 
of presidential candidates through the beliefs they articulate through a rhetorical lens, it is even 
more apparent how rhetoric truly drives the beliefs that have dominated the American political 
system for years.   
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APPENDIX A: OPERATIONAL CODE SCORES AND VALUES  
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Value 
Name 
Phil
oso
phic
al 
Me
ani
ng 
How It’s Calculated Degrees of the Value Interpretation  
I1 
App
roac
h to 
goal
s 
(dir
ecti
on 
of 
strat
egy)  
Calculated by subtracting 
the number of negative 
verbs from the number of 
positive verbs and dividing 
the result by total number 
of negative and positive 
verbs. 
-1 (Extremely Conflict) through +1 
(Extremely Cooperation) 
 
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | -.50 
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0 
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50 
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0 
(extremely) 
He/she believes that 
a _____ _____-
oriented direction is 
the best strategy in 
this universe.  
 
He/she believes that 
a definitely 
cooperative-
oriented direction is 
the best strategy in 
this universe. (-.50) 
I2 
Purs
uit 
of 
goal
s 
(inte
nsit
y of 
tacti
cs)  
Calculated by multiplying 
each verb by the scale 
values associated with its 
coding category, summing 
the results, then calculating 
the average (mean) score 
and dividing it by three. 
-1 (Extremely Conflict) through +1 
(Extremely Cooperation) 
 
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | .50 
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0 
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50 
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0 
(extremely) 
He/she believes that 
_____ _____ tactics 
are best under this 
condition. 
 
He/she believes that 
somewhat 
cooperative tactics 
are best under this 
condition. (+.25)  
I3 
Risk 
orie
ntati
on 
(ave
rse/
acce
ptan
t)  
Takes into account the 
dispersion of verbs. 
Employs a measure of 
dispersion, the Index of 
Qualitative Variation 
(IQV) which assesses the 
variation in the distribution 
of observations among the 
six categories for self and 
others.  
 
Calculated separately for 
self and other attributions, 
the IQV scores is 
subtracted from 1.0 to 
0.0 (Risk Averse) through 1.0 (Risk 
Acceptant) 
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50 
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very 
High) 
As a leader, he/she 
is relatively ______ 
to risk.  
 
As a leader, he/she 
is relatively very 
acceptant to risk. 
(.93) 
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estimate the predictability 
of this value. 
I4a 
Tim
ing 
of 
Acti
on: 
flexi
bilit
y of 
coo
p/co
nf 
tacti
cs  
Calculated by subtracting 
the absolute value of the 
balance index for 
cooperation/conflict from 
one.  
0.0 (Flexibility) through 1.0 
(Flexibility) 
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50 
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very 
High) 
A leader’s 
propensity to shift 
between 
cooperative/conflict
ual tactics is ____.  
 
A leader’s 
propensity to shift 
between 
cooperative/conflict
ual tactics is 
extremely low. (.07) 
 
I4b 
Tim
ing 
of 
Acti
on: 
Flex
ibili
ty of 
wor
d/de
ed 
tacti
cs  
Calculated by subtracting 
the absolute value of the 
balance index for 
words/deeds from one. 
0.0 (Flexibility) through 1.0 
(Flexibility) 
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50 
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very 
High) 
A leaders 
propensity to shift 
between word and 
deed tactics is 
______.  
 
A leader’s 
propensity to shift 
between word and 
deed tactics is high. 
(.74) 
Punish 
Utili
ty of 
Mea
ns: 
Con
flict 
Mea
ns 
(I5) 
(De
eds) 
A series of proportion 
indices measure the 
leader’s beliefs  
 
The medium proportion of 
equal utility each this value 
is .16.  
 
Proportions that exceed or 
fail to reach that level are 
assigned higher or lower 
descriptions of utility.  
 
Can be analyzed 
proportionately or by its 
descriptor.  
0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)  
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16 
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very 
High) 
A leader’s 
propensity to punish 
is ______.  
 
A leader’s 
propensity is very 
high. (.31)  
Threaten 
Utili
ty of 
Mea
A series of proportion 
indices measure the 
leader’s beliefs  
0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)  
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16 
A leader’s reliance 
on threaten tactics is 
_______. 
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ns: 
Con
flict 
Mea
ns 
(I5) 
(Wo
rds)  
 
The medium proportion of 
equal utility each this value 
is .16.  
 
Proportions that exceed or 
fail to reach that level are 
assigned higher or lower 
descriptions of utility.  
 
Can be analyzed 
proportionately or by its 
descriptor. 
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very 
High) 
 
A leader’s reliance 
on threaten tactics is 
very low. (.02) 
Oppose 
Utili
ty of 
Mea
ns: 
Con
flict 
Mea
ns 
(I5) 
(Wo
rds) 
A series of proportion 
indices measure the 
leader’s beliefs  
 
The medium proportion of 
equal utility each this value 
is .16.  
 
Proportions that exceed or 
fail to reach that level are 
assigned higher or lower 
descriptions of utility.  
 
Can be analyzed 
proportionately or by its 
descriptor. 
0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)  
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16 
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very 
High) 
A leader’s reliance 
on oppose tactics is 
_________.  
 
A leader’s reliance 
on oppose tactics is 
medium. (.15) 
Appeal 
Utili
ty of 
Mea
ns: 
Coo
pera
tive 
Mea
ns 
(I5) 
(Wo
rds)  
A series of proportion 
indices measure the 
leader’s beliefs  
 
The medium proportion of 
equal utility each this value 
is .16.  
 
Proportions that exceed or 
fail to reach that level are 
assigned higher or lower 
descriptions of utility.  
 
Can be analyzed 
proportionately or by its 
descriptor. 
0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)  
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16 
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very 
High) 
A leader’s reliance 
on appeal tactics is 
_________.  
 
A leader’s reliance 
on appeal tactics is 
very high. (.30) 
Promise 
Utili
ty of 
Mea
A series of proportion 
indices measure the 
leader’s beliefs  
0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)  
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16 
A leader’s reliance 
on promise tactics is 
________.  
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ns: 
Coo
pera
tive 
Mea
ns 
(I5) 
(De
eds) 
 
The medium proportion of 
equal utility each this value 
is .16.  
 
Proportions that exceed or 
fail to reach that level are 
assigned higher or lower 
descriptions of utility.  
 
Can be analyzed 
proportionately or by its 
descriptor. 
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very 
High) 
 
 
A leader’s reliance 
on promise tactics is 
low. (.07) 
Reward 
Utili
ty of 
Mea
ns: 
Coo
pera
tive 
Mea
ns 
(I5) 
(De
eds) 
A series of proportion 
indices measure the 
leader’s beliefs  
 
The medium proportion of 
equal utility each this value 
is .16.  
 
Proportions that exceed or 
fail to reach that level are 
assigned higher or lower 
descriptions of utility.  
 
Can be analyzed 
proportionately or by its 
descriptor. 
 
0.0 (Utility) though .32 (Utility)  
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .08 (Low) | .16 
(Medium) | .24 (High) | .32 (Very 
High) 
A leader’s reliance 
on reward tactics is 
________.  
 
A leader’s reliance 
on reward tactics is 
high. (.25) 
P1 
Nat
ure 
of 
the 
polit
ical 
univ
erse  
Calculated by subtracting 
the number of negative 
verbs from the number of 
positive verbs and dividing 
the result by total number 
of negative and positive 
verbs.  
-1 (Extremely Hostile) through +1 
(Extremely Friendly) 
 
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | .50 
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0 
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50 
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0 
(extremely) 
He/she believes that 
the political 
universe is ______ 
_______.  
 
He/she believes that 
the political 
universe is 
somewhat hostile. 
(-.25)   
P2 
Pros
pect
s for 
reali
zati
on 
of 
polit
ical 
Calculated by multiplying 
each verb by the scale 
values associated with its 
coding category, summing 
the results, then calculating 
the average (mean) score 
and dividing it by three.  
-1 (Pessimism) through +1 
(Optimism) 
 
-1 (extremely) | -.75 (very) | .50 
(definitely) | -.25 (somewhat) | 0.0 
(mixed) | +.25 (somewhat) | +.50 
(definitely) | +.75 (very) | +1.0 
(extremely) 
He/she believes that 
the prospects for 
realizing 
fundamental 
political goals are 
_____ ______.  
 
He/she believes that 
the prospects for 
77  
valu
es  
realizing 
fundamental 
political goals 
aresomewhat 
pessimistic. (-.25)  
P3 
Pred
icta
bilit
y of 
polit
ical 
futu
re  
Takes into account the 
dispersion of verbs. 
Employs a measure of 
dispersion, the Index of 
Qualitative Variation 
(IQV) which assesses the 
variation in the distribution 
of observations among the 
six categories for self and 
others.  
 
Calculated separately for 
self and other attributions, 
the IQV scores is 
subtracted from 1.0 to 
estimate the predictability 
of this value.  
0.0 (Predictability) through 1.0 
(Predictability) 
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50 
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very 
High) 
 A leader’s beliefs 
with scores of ___ 
attribute _______ 
predictability to 
others and self.  
 
A leader’s beliefs 
with scores of .08 
attribute very low 
predictability to 
others and self. 
P4 
Beli
ef in 
hist
oric
al 
cont
rol  
A series of proportion 
indices measure the 
leader’s beliefs  
 
The number of self or other 
attributions as a percentage 
of the total number of self 
or other attributions varies 
between 0.0 and 1.0.  
0.0 (Control) through 1.0 (Control) 
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50 
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very 
High) 
A leader with a 
score of ____ 
believes that he/she 
has a ____ degree 
of control over 
historical 
development.  
 
A leader with a 
score of .47 believes 
that he/she has a 
medium degree of 
control over 
historical 
development.  
P5 
Rol
e of 
Cha
nce  
Calculated by multiplying 
the leader’s scores for the 
beliefs regarding 
predictability of the 
political future and the 
degree of control over 
historical development, 
and subtracting the product 
from one.  
 
The logic of the index is 
0.0 (Chance) through 1.0 (Chance) 
 
0.0 (Very Low) | .25 (Low) | .50 
(Medium) | .75 (High) | 1.0 (Very 
High) 
A leader with an 
index of __ 
attributes a _____ 
role to chance.  
 
A leader with an 
index of .96 
attributes a very 
high role to chance.  
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that the higher the 
predictability of the 
political future and the 
greater the leader’s belief 
in his or her ability to 
control historical 
development, the less the 
role of chance.  
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APPENDIX B: DEBATE WINNERS AND LOSERS  
80  
 
Election 
Year 
Debate 
Date Winner Loser(s) Citation 
1976 
September 26 Gerald Ford – R Jimmy Carter – D Schroeder – pg 101 October 6 Jimmy Carter – D Gerald Ford - R Schroeder – pg 101 October 22 Jimmy Carter – D Gerald Ford - R Schroeder – pg 101 
1980 September 21 Ronald Reagan – R John Anderson – I Change and Continuity, Pg 45, 1982 October 28 Ronald Reagan – R Jimmy Carter – D  Change and Continuity, Pg 45, 1982 
1984 October 7 Walter Mondale – D Ronald Reagan – R Change and Continuity, Pg 58, 1986 October 21 Ronald Reagan – R Walter Mondale – D Change and Continuity, Pg 60, 1986 
1988 September 25 George H. W. Bush – R Michael Dukakis – D Change and Continuity, Pg 49, 1990 October 13 George H. W. Bush – R Michael Dukakis – D Change and Continuity, Pg 50, 1990 
1992 
October 11 Ross Perot – I; Bill Clinton – D George H. W. – R Change and Continuity, Pg 57, 1995 October 15 Bill Clinton – D Ross Perot – I; George H. W. Bush – R Change and Continuity, Pg 60, 1995 October 19 Ross Perot – I Bill Clinton – D; George H. W. Bush Change and Continuity, Pg 61, 1995 
1996 October 6 Bill Clinton – D Bob Dole – R Change and Continuity, Pg 35, 1999 October 16 Bill Clinton – D Bob Dole – R Change and Continuity, Pg 36, 1999 
2000 
October 3 Al Gore – D George W. Bush Change and Continuity, Pg 37, 2003 October 11 George W. Bush – R Al Gore – D Change and Continuity, Pg 38, 2003 October 17 George W. Bush – R Al Gore – D Change and Continuity, Pg 38, 2003 
2004 
September 30 John Kerry – D George W. Bush – R Change and Continuity, Pg 41, 2006 October 8 Tie Tie Change and Continuity, Pg 41, 2006 October 13 John Kerry – D George W. Bush – R Change and Continuity, Pg 41, 2006 
81  
2008 
September 26 Barack Obama – D John McCain – R http://www.gallup.com/poll/110779/Debate-Watchers-Give-Obama-Edge-Over-McCain.aspx October 7 Barack Obama – D John McCain – R http://www.gallup.com/poll/111058/obama-rated-winner-second-presidential-debate.aspx October 15 Barack Obama – D John McCain – R http://www.gallup.com/poll/111256/obama-viewed-winner-third-debate.aspx 
2012 
October 3 Romney Obama 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/polls-show-a-strong-debate-for-romney/ 
October 16 Obama Romney 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/instant-reaction-polls-show-narrow-obama-advantage-in-second-debate/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 
October 22 Obama Romney 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/obama-unlikely-to-get-big-debate-bounce-but-a-small-one-could-matter/ 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF CANDIDATE CODES AND CORRESPONDING 
DEBATES  
Debate Date and Candidate Code September 23, 1976 Carter Carter 1.1 October 6, 1976 Carter Carter 1.2 October 22, 1976 Carter Carter 1.3 October 28, 1980 Carter Carter 2.1 September 23, 1976 Ford Ford 1.1 October 6, 1976 Ford Ford 1.2 October 22, 1976 Ford Ford 1.3 September 21, 1980 Reagan Reagan 1.1 October 28, 1980 Reagan Reagan 1.2 October 7, 1984 Reagan Reagan 2.1 October 21, 1984 Reagan Reagan 2.2 September 21, 1980 Anderson Anderson 1.1 October 7, 1984 Mondale Mondale 1.1 October 21, 1984 Mondale Mondale 1.2 September 25, 1988 Bush HW Bush 1.1 October 13, 1988 Bush HW Bush 1.2 October 11, 1992 Bush HW Bush 2.1 October 15, 1992 Bush HW Bush 2.2 October 19, 1992 Bush HW Bush 2.3 September 25, 1988 Dukakis Dukakis 1.1 October 13, 1988 Dukakis Dukakis 1.2 October 11, 1992 Clinton Clinton 1.1 October 15, 1992 Clinton Clinton 1.2 October 19, 1992 Clinton Clinton 1.3 October 6, 1996 Clinton Clinton 2.1 October 16,  1996 Clinton Clinton 2.2 October 3, 2000 Bush W Bush 1.1 October 11, 2000 Bush W Bush 1.2 October 17, 2000 Bush W Bush 1.3 September 30, 2004 Bush W Bush 2.1 October 8, 2004 Bush W Bush 2.2 October 13, 2004 Bush W Bush 2.3 October 11, 1992 Perot Perot 1.1 October 15, 1992 Perot Perot 1.2 October 19, 1992 Perot Perot 1.3 October 6, 1996 Dole Dole 1.1 October 16,  1996 Dole Dole 1.2 October 3, 2000 Gore Gore 1.1 October 11, 2000 Gore Gore 1.2 October 17, 2000 Gore Gore 1.3 September 30, 2004 Kerry Kerry 1.1 October 8, 2004 Kerry Kerry 1.2 October 13, 2004 Kerry Kerry 1.3 September 26, 2008 Obama Obama 1.1 October 7, 2008 Obama Obama 1.2 October 15, 2008 Obama Obama 1.3 October 3, 2012 Obama Obama 2.1 October 16, 2012 Obama Obama 2.2 October 22, 2012 Obama Obama 2.3 September 26, 2008 McCain McCain 1.1 October 7, 2008 McCain McCain 1.2 October 15, 2008 McCain McCain 1.3 October 3, 2012 Romney Romney 1.1 October 16, 2012 Romney Romney 1.2 October 22, 2012 Romney Romney 1.3 
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APPENDIX D: MEAN SCORES COMPARISON TABLE – BY PARTY AND 
YEAR  
85  
 
Year D1R2I3 P1 P2 P4 I1 I2 
1976 1 Dem .1933 .0333 .2167 .4400 .1933 
2 Repub .4600 .2767 .2467 .5600 .3300 
Total .3267 .1550 .2317 .5000 .2617 
1980 1 Dem .5000 .3600 .1700 .3700 .1200 
2 Repub .2250 .0500 .2650 .3700 .1050 
3 Indep .2500 .1800 .3200 .5800 .1900 
Total .3000 .1600 .2550 .4225 .1300 
1984 1 Dem .1400 .0350 .2850 .1650 .0350 
2 Repub .0650 -.0200 .3300 .3350 .1250 
Total .1025 .0075 .3075 .2500 .0800 
1988 1 Dem .4600 .2250 .3350 .4300 .1750 
2 Repub .3100 .1050 .4200 .4850 .2050 
Total .3850 .1650 .3775 .4575 .1900 
1992 1 Dem .4733 .2500 .3133 .5833 .2533 
2 Repub .3800 .1833 .3667 .2433 .0633 
3 Indep .4000 .2000 .2667 .4767 .1733 
Total .4178 .2111 .3156 .4344 .1633 
1996 1 Dem .4450 .2450 .3300 .5400 .2600 
2 Repub .3900 .1900 .3650 .5400 .2300 
Total .4175 .2175 .3475 .5400 .2450 
2000 1 Dem .2967 .1400 .3600 .5700 .2967 
2 Repub .4233 .2133 .3667 .5933 .2500 
Total .3600 .1767 .3633 .5817 .2733 
2004 1 Dem .1767 .0667 .3600 .4133 .1833 
2 Repub .2033 .0767 .3367 .4267 .1867 
Total .1900 .0717 .3483 .4200 .1850 
2008 1 Dem .2800 .1133 .3033 .2600 .0700 
2 Repub .4033 .1700 .3267 .1933 .0467 
Total .3417 .1417 .3150 .2267 .0583 
2012 1 Dem .3467 .1533 .3200 .1367 .0433 
2 Repub .2767 .1067 .3600 .2433 .1233 
Total .3117 .1300 .3400 .1900 .0833 
86  
Total 1 Dem .3156 .1456 .3076 .3940 .1672 
2 Repub .3238 .1435 .3373 .3938 .1665 
3 Indep .3625 .1950 .2800 .5025 .1775 
Total .3229 .1482 .3196 .4018 .1676     
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APPENDIX E: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS FOR ALL OP. 
CODE VALUES   
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APPENDIX F: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS BY DEBATE  
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APPENDIX G:  
MEAN COMPARISON TABLE OF OP. CODE SCORES BY 
WINNER/LOSER OF PRESIDENCY AND YEAR 
Report 
Mean 
Year 
POTUS1
Yes2No 
P1 P2 P4 I1 I2 
1976 
1.0 .1933 .0333 .2167 .4400 .1933 
2.0 .4600 .2767 .2467 .5600 .3300 
Total .3267 .1550 .2317 .5000 .2617 
1980 
1.0 .3167 .1533 .2333 .3700 .1100 
2.0 .2500 .1800 .3200 .5800 .1900 
Total .3000 .1600 .2550 .4225 .1300 
1984 
1.0 .0650 -.0200 .3300 .3350 .1250 
2.0 .1400 .0350 .2850 .1650 .0350 
Total .1025 .0075 .3075 .2500 .0800 
1988 
1.0 .3100 .1050 .4200 .4850 .2050 
2.0 .4600 .2250 .3350 .4300 .1750 
Total .3850 .1650 .3775 .4575 .1900 
1992 
1.0 .4267 .2167 .3400 .4133 .1583 
2.0 .4000 .2000 .2667 .4767 .1733 
Total .4178 .2111 .3156 .4344 .1633 
1996 
1.0 .4450 .2450 .3300 .5400 .2600 
2.0 .3900 .1900 .3650 .5400 .2300 
Total .4175 .2175 .3475 .5400 .2450 
2000 
1.0 .4233 .2133 .3667 .5933 .2500 
2.0 .2967 .1400 .3600 .5700 .2967 
Total .3600 .1767 .3633 .5817 .2733 
2004 
1.0 .2033 .0767 .3367 .4267 .1867 
2.0 .1767 .0667 .3600 .4133 .1833 
Total .1900 .0717 .3483 .4200 .1850 
2008 1.0 .2800 .1133 .3033 .2600 .0700 
100  
2.0 .4033 .1700 .3267 .1933 .0467 
Total .3417 .1417 .3150 .2267 .0583 
2012 
1.0 .3467 .1533 .3200 .1367 .0433 
2.0 .2767 .1067 .3600 .2433 .1233 
Total .3117 .1300 .3400 .1900 .0833 
Total 
1.0 .3163 .1397 .3177 .3960 .1563 
2.0 .3308 .1584 .3220 .4088 .1812 
Total .3229 .1482 .3196 .4018 .1676      
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APPENDIX H: MEAN SCORE COMPARISON CHARTS BY 
WINNER/LOSER AND YEAR  
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APPENDIX I: ORIGINAL OP. CODE SCORES FOR ALL CANDIDATES 
AND DEBATES   
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